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PREFACE 
When a study is made reciprocally by the 
peoples of the East and the West of all those de-
tails of differences in the general outlook on 
life, then will the East and West be brought 
closer; someday the East and West may meet and jointly form ofe world • • • the world of infin-
ity and peace. 
The following thesis is an attempt at such a study 
made in one specific area--the revision and ratification 
of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty, 1960. 
The general concern of this study is with social 
change. The specific concern is with both peoples' and na-
tions' actions and reactions to the revision and ratifica-
tion of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty. 
The hypothesis of the study is that most of the 
problem areas in Japan today can be traced to important 
upsets to the serene regard for tradition and hierarchy 
hitherto maintained by previous generations of Japanese, 
and to the effects ~f the great and fundamental moderniza-
tion of the country. These changes have directly 
1Ruth Emily McMurry and Muna Lee, The Cultural 
~¥roach: Another WaR in International Relations, Chapel 
R 1: University of orth Carolina Press, 1947, p. 15. 
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influenced the present generation. This has resulted in 
their struggle to maintain and preserve a cultural and 
social equilibrium. By using one particular incident from 
start to finish, all of the above may be analyzed with 
specific examples and references. 
My position is that democracy was not imposed by 
directives of the military occupation authorities. How-
ever, I believe, the American occupation of Japan did 
leave an inheritance on the abstract, ideological level 
that will in time make possible a synthesis on the indi-
vidual level in which more and more citizens will accept 
the responsibility of their own positions to the community, 
but will retain their freedom of conscience and moral 
integrity. ·Through the study of the u.s. - Japan Security 
Treaty it becomes apparent where weaknesses exist which 
still prevent Japan from developing even more rapidly into 
a responsible democracy and which hinder U.S. - Japan rela-
tions. This hypothesis will be tested by people's actions 
and reactions to media, pressure groups, opinion leaders, 
propaganda and outside forces concerning the revision and 
ratification of the u.s. -Japan Security Treaty. 
The significance and contribution of this study 
to the field of public relations in three-fold: First, 
this research enables us to analyze and study the media and 
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their impacts on a culture inherently different than ours. 
Secondly, it enables an analysis of all the forces, 
both outside and inside a country, which shape an inter-
national incident. We are provided with insights into all 
the various struggles which are not usually discussed or 
reported upon and which finally led to one significant in-
cident of world wide importance. It is always a contribu-
tion to any field when the causes of a meaningful event can 
be analyzed in depth. Often, there emerges reasons differ-
ent, yet logical and documentable, which are divergent from 
the majority viewpoint. Thus the study adds to public re-
lations aspects of international relations. 
Thirdly, I hope by introducing a study of the in-
terplay of culture on the revision and ratification of the 
U.S. -Japan Security Treaty to encourage further studies 
of Japan and other countries where U.S. military personnel 
are stationed. Military personnel stationed abroad are 
often caught up in local situations involving peoples' 
actions and reactions. Every study dealing with a foreign 
nation and successful U.S.A.F. programs with that nation 
adds to the growing body of literature needed for the edu-
cation and understanding of those about to embark upon an 
overseas assignment as representatives of the United States. 
These representatives are in the front lines of democratic 
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forces of international public relations. 
This thesis is based largely on work conducted in 
Tokyo, Japan and environs while the writer was serving as 
a career officer of the U.S.A.F. on a normal overseas ro-
tational assignment at Fuchu Air Station, Japan. 
Although interviews with responsible representa-
tives of the government of Japan and the United States 
were great sources of information, the conclusions in this 
thesis will be the writer's own and will not necessarily 
reflect the views of the governments of Japan, the United 
States or the United States Air Force. 
PART ONE 
BACKGROUND OF U, S, - JAPAN SECURITY TREATY 
CHAPTER I 
JAPANESE CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT: 1945-1952 
On June 20, 1963, the president of the United 
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, announced to the world that 
he had cancelled his scheduled trip to Japan at the re-
quest of the Japanese government. 
The cancellation of this visit was but one of the 
aspects of the most successful political warfare opera-
tions in recent times--the attempt to block the ratifica-
tion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This would not 
have been possible had not the basic issues been confused 
and conscientious people used for ends they thought were 
democratic. 
To fully understand how this type of confusion 
could prevail in Japan, it becomes necessary to return to 
the Japan of 1945 and the prevailing American policy. 
Thus, we can trace the cultural climate of the times. 
The United States had begun to formulate policy 
for occupied Japan long before the war ended and some de-
cisions regarding Japan had been reached in the form of 
allied declarations. That phase of American policy which 
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has been called "punishment and reform" is given in full-
est detail in two documents on "Initial Post-Surrender 
Policy" sent from Washington to General MacArthur on Aug-
ust 29 and November 8, 1945. 
For several years these documents represented the 
constitution against which American occupation policy was 
tested. More specifically, this policy was to conform to 
two major objectives: 
to insure that Japan will not again become a menace 
to the United States or to the security of the world 
and secondly, to help produce a peaceful government, 
supporting the objectives of the United States and 
the ideals of the United Nations, a government 
selected by the Japanese people themselves, but pre-
ferably a democracy.l 
The American occupation of Japan, under the very 
able leadership of General Douglas MacArthur fell into 
three successive phases--reform, retrenchment and finally 
revision. 
The phase of revision offers the most to us in 
analyzing the reasons the Japanese people were used and 
issues confused in the revision and ratification of the 
U.S.-Japan security treaty. However, a brush effect of 
the other two phases is needed. 
lunited States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for 
Japan (August 29, 1945) and the Basic Initial Post-
Surrender Directive (November 8, 1945). 
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Reform 
The first phase--reform--lasted from the surrender 
until 1947. This was the most important phase since it 
was rapid and the most drastic. The American concept was 
that Japan could be made more democratic through reform, 
thus becoming a peaceful and more stable country. This was 
not seen merely as a political problem. If Japan were to 
become more democratic, it needed a new policy--a fairer 
division of power and wealth between the peasants, city 
laborers, and the more privileged classes. The United 
States sponsored a social as well as political revolution 
in Japan. 
The reform era represented the American New Deal, 
somewhat late and somewhat altered to Japanese require-
ments, but still strongly colored by that famous and re-
cent epoch in American history. The reforms encompassing 
war crime trials, demilitarization and purging were all es-
sentially negative programs. However, the bulk of American 
energy during this period was spent on more positive meas-
ures. The political reform program centered around the new 
Japanese constitution of 1947, a document now under sub-
stantial conservative attack. The most controversial 
article in the Constitution was inserted by General 
MacArthur himself--the famous Article 9, in which war or 
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the use of force is renounced and "land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential" are forbidden to 
be maintained. This has proved to be embarassing to both 
the American and Japanese governments. 
In addition to giving a more democratic structure 
to the central government the Occupation also instituted 
reforms aimed at making local government more responsive 
to public feeling. The prefectural governships and the 
other local offices were made elective and the legislative 
branch of the local governments were given wider author-
ity. The police system was decentralized (a point to be-
labor in discussing the 1960 treaty struggle). It was 
placed under elected local police commissions, though 
places too small to afford a force were allowed to use a 
rural police force organized by the central government. 
Occupation authorities felt that changes in polit-
ical institutions had to be backed by social and educa-
tional changes. Japanese law codes were revised giving 
women equality with men in all respects. The basic unit 
recognized by Japanese law was changed from the family to 
the individual. Compulsory education was changed from six 
years to nine years. A large part of control over the 
educational system was given to locally elected school 
boards. Textbooks were revised to eliminate concentration 
on nationalism and the teaching of morals was banned. 
On December 15, 1945, the Japanese government 
was ordered to end all state support of Shinto 
shrines and to halt the teaching of Shinto in the 
schools. In the future there was to be no com-
pulsory participation in Shinto ritual and no 
propogatioa of the idea that the Japanese ruler 
was superior to other rulers or the Japanese 
superior to other peoples. In a rescript issued 
on January l, 1946, the Emperor repudiated the con-
ception that he was divine or that the Japanese 
people were destined to rule the world.2 
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Three additional reforms of key importance reveal 
some very interesting facets of American society in action 
in Asia. The land-reform program was one of the most 
radical undertaken up to that point in the Far East, yet 
it conformed in general with the American ideal of the 
family-owned farm. Inflation rendered the compensation 
formula for landlords almost meaningless and the program 
had the unplanned effect of bringing about a substantial 
change in the composition of the agrarian classes. In the 
economic deconcentration program, another American ideal 
was pursued: the reduction of monopoly and encouragement 
of competition. But here, serious obstacles were met in 
the nature of Japanese society and ultimately this program 
2Arthur Tiedman, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
1955). 
Modern Japan: A Brief History D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 
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settled for the reduction of certain family fortunes, a 
fairly strong attack upon the large cartels and trusts, 
and the establishment of anti~onopoly and trust laws pat-
terned upon the American model. Perhaps the most substan-
tial reform or accomplishment of the Occupation's reform 
phase was to shift the nature and power of pressure groups 
in Japanese society, and thereby produce many new possi-
bilities in the domestic political scene. For example, 
the military class was decimated (at least for the pres-
ent) and new groups such as organized labor were encour-
aged and allowed to expand. 
Retrenchment 
After 1946, the United States gradually became 
aware of the fact that its original postwar premises con-
cerning Asia and the world were no longer valid. We had 
foreseen one general trend--the emergence of Asia as a 
dynamic world force instead of merely remaining the pas-
sive recipient of Western power, We based our premise 
upon a democratic China serving as a stabilizer and symbol 
of that Asia, but the signs for Nationalist China were in-
creasingly unfavorable. All of Asia represented a power 
vacuum produced by both the precipitous withdrawal and 
heavy reduction of Western power on the one hand and the 
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weakness of newly independent or reorganized Asian govern-
ments on the other. There was political and economic un-
rest and South and Southeast Asian nationalist movements 
were reaching a climax with old colonial powers their 
chief targets. The United States viewed the situation as 
critical. This was true also because our relations with 
the Soviet Union had rapidly deteriorated everywhere in 
the world. We now strongly believed that the Soviet-led 
forces of the world Communism would use any tactics to 
fill the power vacuum of Asia, building upon their foot-
holds in China, North Korea and other regions where they 
commanded some indigenous support. 
It was becoming obvious that Japan itself was a 
primary battlefield in the cold war. The American 
occupation of Japan was clearly an experiment in 
democratic reform and rehabilitation, and the suc-
cess or failure of that experiment would inevitably 
have a great ideological impact on the billion odd 
people of Asia. The future role of Japan, the only 
area of great industrial capacity and potential 
military power in Asia, had also become a vital 
question. At the end of the war Japan had seemed 
a hopelessly defeated and isolated nation in the 
face of a united and triumphant world. In a 
divided world she was a crucial factor in the 
balance of pQwer--militarily, economically, and 
politically.3 
The American success in Japan had become doubtful 
despite its importance to both the United States and the 
3Edwin o. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present 
(Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1962, pp. 212-
213. 
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whole free world. Japanese economy remained in the dol-
drums. Production was low and inflation was still rampant, 
producing a vicious price-wage spiral which threatened a 
complete collapse. Population was steadily increasing. 
These developments had an obvious effect upon the 
democratization experiment, a fact that could not long 
escape American attentton. Democracy or political stabil-
ity of any sort would not be possible without economic 
stability. Political and social reform while desirable, 
had little chance for eventual success without a sound 
economic substructure. These developments also related to 
the costs that the American taxpayer had to assume to help 
keep the Japanese people alive. Thus, economic recovery 
or retrenchment became a major objective and reform efforts 
which conflicted with this were modified or dropped. In 
December, 1948, a thoroughgoing economic retrenchment pro-
gram was forced upon the Japanese government. The decon-
centration program tapered off with the breakup of cartels 
but most of their large component units lay intact. Labor 
unions, which had been encouraged by the occupation, were 
restrained from any acts which might cut into Japanese 
production. The u.s. was now exhorting the Japanese 
people, officials and citizens alike, to make heroic ef-
forts to rehabilitate themselves. The new key word for 
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American policy in Japan was "Recovery." The Dodge Plan, 
a severe austerity program of 1949 designed to place the 
Japanese economy back on its feet, achieved considerable 
success. Nineteen forty-nine represented a year of rela-
tive price stability and accelerated recovery in many 
spheres of the economy, particularly in production. 
With this new U.S. policy, despite its efforts to 
maintain an official nonpartisan position, occupation 
favoritism for the conservative~ particularly the Liberals, 
became more pronounced. This led to frustration on the 
part of the Socialists, because they could not attack the 
Occupation openly and they had no way to meet its power. 
They had no hope of capturing control. It was in this 
area that disagreement between the position of the U.S. 
and that of the Japanese Socialists came into focus. This 
remains a serious and unsolved problem. The U.S. is still 
estranged from the main stream of the Japanese socialist 
movement economy, particularly in production. 
A Critical Look 
The United States' change in emphasis in Japan 
caused a growing divergence of opinion. Americans lost 
some of their previous assurance while Japanese gained 
a resurgence of self confidence coupled with critical 
judgment. 
The despair and confusion of the early post-
war years was wearing off and many Japanese began 
to realize that not all that was distinctively 
Japanese was bad and not all that the Americans 
were attempting was wise. While most Japanese 
remained impressed by the good will and enthusi-
asm of their American mentors and sympathetic 
toward their major objectives, they came to see 
that in many details the occupation had been fol-
lowing American patterns too closely and, thus, 
had been sometimes attempting to do either the 
unnecessary or the impossible,4 
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American policies were being criticized more; re-
sentment grew of the luxuries and privileges the Americans 
allowed themselves at the expense or inconveniences of the 
Japanese people. Such resentment was inevitable, but sur-
prisingly developed relatively slowly. Younger Japanese, 
especially students, became more chauvinistic, often ex-
pressing it in pro-Communist terms. 
Revision 
The time has come for revision--the end of the oc-
cupation. Efforts to end the occupation by a peace 
treaty were begun in 1947, but the Soviet Union blocked 
all efforts to hold a peace conference. This caused an 
impasse of several years, prolonging the occupation. How-
ever, the need to end the occupation grew with the passing 
years. The U.S. decided to proceed without Russian 
11 
participation. Dulles was appointed as a State Department 
advisor in April 1950. At the same time the decision to 
enter discussion of the peace treaty the following Septem-
ber was announced. The text of the peace treaty was agreed 
upon in advance of the conference by the U.S. and each of 
the other interested countries. This was an innovation in 
diplomatic procedures, made possible by the increased 
facilities for rapid communications between world capitals. 
The process of transfer of authority and revision 
of policy was accelerated by two external factors. One 
was the invasion of South Korea by the Communist Regime of 
North Korea on June 25, 1950, and the growing involvement 
of the United States in the war which resulted. The other, 
a by-product of the Korean War, MacArthur was dismissed on 
April 11, 1951. 
The Korean War came as a great shock to Americans. 
The U.S. decided to defend the South Korean Republic and 
obtained the support of the United Nations. Immediately 
military strategic considerations became paramount in 
American Far Eastern policy. Our attention became focused 
primarily on military developments in Korea, rather than 
on civil reform in Japan. At the same time, Japan served 
as a key center for American procurement demands and 
economic recovery was greatly assisted. 
12 
It was in this atmosphere of world tension and 
bloodshed that the United States entered into negotiations 
with Japan and the non-Communist Allies for the end of 
the occupation and the restoration of full Japanese 
sovereignty. These negotiations were conducted primarily 
in early 1951. On September 8, a peace treaty with Japan 
was signed by forty-eight nations at San Francisco, com-
ing into effect officially on April 28, Japan was given 
the right of individual or collective self defense as a 
sovereign nation; it was also provided that bilateral or 
multi-lateral agreements with Japan could be made permit-
ting the stationing or retention of foreign troops in 
Japanese territory. The Japanese agreed to territorial 
changes made by the allies. They agreed to American 
trusteeship in Okinawa and the Bonina. They renounced 
all rights acquired in China and any claims on the Antartic. 
No economic restrictions were imposed, but Japan agreed to 
enter into reparation negotiations with any signatory who 
wished to do so. 
The United States faced many thorny problems in 
connection with this treaty. The key issues were all 
interrelated in some degree. Questions relating to the 
future security of Japan and through Japan of the United 
States were naturally given special emphasis. Japan as 
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the only induatrialized aociety of Ali& waa regarded aa a 
likely taraet of Soviet aaareaaion. It W&l &lao reaarded 
by American official• &I a vital link and northern anchor 
in our ialand defenae perimeter around continental Aaia. 
Increaainaly durina tbi1 period, the concept of an ialand 
"cordon eanitaire" bad appealed to many Americana. The 
theory waa that tbrouah aucb a defenaive device we could 
make maximum uae of American air power; and by maintain· 
ing ba1e1 from Japan through Okinawa and the Pbilippinea, 
we could deter any aaareaaion atemmina from the mainland 
and protect the Pacific in depth. Certainly it waa clear 
that without the Japaneae baaea, it would have been ex• 
tremely difficult, if not impoaaible, to have fought the 
Korean War, and that war waa not yet finiahed. 
Conaequently, the u.s. leaned heavily toward the 
plan of a bilateral aecurity treaty with Japan providina 
for the continuance of American baaes in that country 
and looking toward the gradual buildup of Japaneae de· 
fense forces. Mr. Dulles, the u.s. representative on the 
Japan negotiations emphasized from the beginning the 
right of Japan to create a aelf·defense force to ward off 
aggression, insisting that this need not produce a revived 
Japanese militarism. Coupled with this defense of 
Japanese rearmament waa an American offer to retain bases 
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and troops in Japan, at least until such ttme as Japan 
could complete her own security arrangements. This became 
the basis for the Security Treaty which was signed with 
Japan at the same time as the Peace Treaty. 
In the course of seven years, our policy toward 
Japan had undergone some amazing changes in an attempt to 
follow world trends, Occupation experience and Japanese 
pressures. We had emerged as a champion of a "rehabili-
tated Japan" seeking recognition and equality for her at 
the world council tables. More than this, we were looking 
to Japan as potentially one of our foremost political and 
military allies in Asia. We had offered her an alliance 
based upon continued economic and military assistance 
from us, contingent upon her own efforts toward self 
defense. This was certainly a monumental shift from the 
days when we had promised to enforce the complete disarma-
ment of Japan and called upon her to find salvation in 
pacifism. 
It would be misleading to imply that all Japanese 
were enthusiastic over American policy. On the contrary, 
issues connected with the revision phase of U.S. policy 
had continued and in some respects exacerbated earlier 
antagonisms. Among some of our policy critics were 
Japanese whose personal relations with Americans were 
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friendly. They even regarded themselves closer to us in 
an ideological sense than a number of the official "pro-
American" forces. The cleavage was one that again de-
marcated the liberal and radical left from the conserva-
tives of all shades. The left held to a view of an over-
all peace, including a settlement with the Communists, 
continued support for Japanese demilitarization and oppo-
sition to post-treaty American bases. The average Japan-
ese conservative supported an immediate Treaty, alliance 
with the West, some rearmament, and acceptance of American 
bases. Within both groups were seious splits. The Peace 
Treaty produced a serious split in Socialist ranks which 
still exists: the Right Wing was willing to accept it, 
but opposed the Security Treaty and the Left Wing opposed 
both treaties. In conservative ranks, also, opinion dif-
fered on the degree and timing of rearmament. 
A general condition overshadowing political dif-
ferences served to keynote the period. The rise of 
Japanese nationalism on all sides and in many forms was 
the most pronounced characteristic of Japan during the 
revision phase of the Occupation. Such a trend was in-
evitable in some degree after a long period of foreign 
occupation and control. The pendulum was swinging back, 
only this time nationalism tempered by pacifism, rather 
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than reenforced by militarism. The fascinating aspect of 
this new nationalism was the endless variety of its forms. 
In prewar Japan, nationalism had been under the control 
of the conservatives. Now it was to be a weapon of all 
elements on the left. This is one of the most signifi-
cant developments in Japanese politics and we shall deal 
with it more fully in the context of the revision and 
ratification of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960--
exactly eight years, one month and twenty-two days from 
the signing of the original treaty. 
CHAPTER II 
REVISION OF THE SECURITY TREATY 
General MacArthur had been directed to make cer-
tain that Japan would not again emerge as a threat to 
world security and to encourage democratic tendencies among 
the Japanese people which would lead to the establishment 
of a peaceful and responsible government. 1 Japan has since 
progressed--socially, economically, and politically--and 
has shown few signs of interest in again becoming "a police 
state" military power. After the Peace Treaty and Security 
Treaty became effective, Japain again participated in world 
affairs and in December 1956 became a member of the United 
1united States Post Surrender Policy for Japan, 
August 29, 1945. The Text of the Postdam Declaration; 
the Instrument of Surrender; the United States Initial 
Post Surrender Policy for Japan; and General MacArthur's 
General Order No. 1 to the Japanese Government will be 
found in SCAP, Political Reorientation of J!tan, Septem-
ber 1945 ~eptember 1948 (2 Volumes. Wash ngton, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), II, p. 442 et seq. 
For a more detailed presentation of this sub-ject as well as other aspects of the first two years of 
the Occupation, see Hugh Borton, "The Allied Occupation 
of Japan, 1942-1947" in F .c. Jones, Hugh Borton and 
R.R. Pearn, The Far East, 1942-1946 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1955), pp. 307-478. 
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Nations. The Japanese Constitution had not been amended 
to permit regular armed forces, and sentiment among the 
people was still against rearmament. Money was not alone 
the limiting factor. Japan had enjoyed a record boom 
since 1957, but spending was for butter--not guns. Japan 
still depended on the United States to provide the neces-
sary external defense, and this stand was evidently a 
popular one with the conservative Japanese people. 2 
On January 25, 1952 Nobusuke Kishi became Prime 
Minister of Japan. With him he brought his fervent desire 
to change Japan-United States relations, to a relationship 
of mutual trust. He wanted to see Japan participate as an 
equal and respected nation in world affairs. He really 
wanted a revision of the "MacArthur Constitution," 
especially Article IX, the no-war clause. 
Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II, agreed 
with Kishi's desire for a relationship of mutual trust for 
Japan and the United States. It was natural; therefore, 
that these two men should set the groundwork for a revised 
security treaty. 
2Problems of and attitudes concerning recent 
economic development are ably treated in Jerome B. Cohen's 
Ja~an's Postwar Economt (Bloomington, 1958) and G.C. AI en's Japan's Econom c Recovery (London, New York, 1958). 
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However, before we discuss the actual revision and 
ratification of the treaty and the struggle that ensued, 
a closer look must be taken at these men, especially Kishi, 
since the treaty struggle eventually evolved into an anti-
Kishi struggle. 
Prime Minister Nobuske Kishi 3 
Nobuske Kishi is a descenqant of the men of Chosu,· 
who, most Japanese intellecutals charge, are completely 
without sentiment and act on the basis of logic and profit. 
They further charge that Kishi is a typical Chosu man. 
Kishi was born in Yamaguchi, a city above the 
Inland Sea, on November 23, 1896. From early childhood he 
had drummed into him the glories of the Sato family, his 
mother's family and the name taken by his father when he 
married. He was never allowed to forget his samurai 
ancestry and was constantly goaded by his mother never to 
take second place. 
At 16, Nobuske's marriage was arranged with a 
cousin, thus be resumed the Kishi name and was stricken 
from the Sato family register. (The marriage did not take 
3A brief study of Kishi's life can be found in 
Chitose Yanaga's Ja~anese People and Politics (Tokyo: 
1954). A better ou i!ne !s found !n the January 21, 1960 
issue of Time • 
........... 
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place until seven years later.) 
Kishi majored in law at Tokyo's Imperial Univer-
sity and graduated with top honors. One advantage for 
him was the making of many left-wing friends during these 
days even though he was a right-wing nationalist. These 
same friends were leaders in the Socialist party when 
Kishi became Prime Minister and the friendships have 
endured. 
Kishi became a civil servant in the Ministry of 
Commerce and was indistinguishable from thousands of 
others. However, he was sent abroad to inspect iron and 
steel plants and accomplished a feat that was to open many 
doors for him--in 1926 he learned to play golf. Back in 
Japan many of the big zaibatsu businessmen were painstak-
ingly learning the game. Quite naturally Kishi, a nobody, 
played in their foursomes. This annoyed the Minister of 
Commerce so that Kishi resigned and went to Manchuria as 
industrial adviser to the Japanese puppet government. 
It was at this time Japan was inwardly raging in 
a power struggle between parliamentarians and militarists. 
The militarists won and the army occupied all of Manchuria. 
Meanwhile Kishi was succeeding well in Manchuria--
he created and developed industry there and became good 
friends with the army commander, General Hideki Tojo. 
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He returned to Japan in 1939 and had run-ins with 
his boss again. However, Tojo formed a new cabinet and 
Kishi was named his Commerce Minister. 
Kishi served the Japanese war machine faithfully 
and well and makes no excuses for this. In April of 1944 
Kishi told Tojo that Saipan was Japan's lifeline and if 
it were lost to surrender. Saipan fell, Tojo's cabinet 
fell and Kishi became suspect. He moved back to Yamaguchi 
where he was in bed ill when the atom bomb fell on 
Hiroshima 70 miles away. 
After Japan's surrender a family council was called 
to determine whether Kishi should commit suicide or await 
American arrest. Kishi went to Sugamo prison for three 
years and was released in 1948 without trial. 
He took a job as Chairman of one Fujiyama company 
and a directorship in another. 
Yoshida was Prime Minister; he daughter was mar-
ried to Kishi's cousin and Kishi's own brother Eisako Sato 
was Secretary-General of the Cabinet. Things were looking 
good to Kishi but he could do nothing until he was de-
purged as a war criminal (this came about in 1952). He 
continued to work in industry and profitably cultivated 
acquaintances among businessmen. 
It took Kishi five years to attain his goal as 
Prime Minister. To accomplish this he formed a Democratic 
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party made up of a dissident segment of Yoshida's Liberals, 
and a group of progressives. He also entered into an al-
liance with the Socialists and on February 25, 1957 became 
Prime Minister of Japan. 
One of Kishi's main problems has been the dealing 
simultaneously with the Socialist opposition and his own 
faction ridden party. In 1960 the Liberal-Democratic 
Party was little more than eight major factions, each with 
its own leader. 
Kishi has stated his goals often. He wants a re-
vision of the ''MacArthur constitution." He proposes to 
make the Emperor again head of state instead of merely a 
symbol, to have provincial governors appointed by Tokyo 
instead of elected and to alter the House of Councilors 
(Japan's Senate) by substituting some appointees for 
elected members. He also wanted to do away with Article 
IX of the constitution (the no-war clause). 
His idea of prosperity for less developed countries 
lies in the combination of "American capital, Japanese 
technology and local resources." Many Japanese business-
men pressed for Red-China trade, but Kishi maintained 
the U.S. was supplying economic aid and buying more Japan-
ese goods than any other single country. Also the U.S. 
guaranteed Japan's security. Here Kishi doesn't show what 
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is seen superficially--pro-Americanism; rather, it is pro-
Japanism. Kishi realized without trade, Japan would die. 
For these reasons Kishi was denounced in Peking 
and became the enemy of 600 million Chinese through 
propaganda, which played a part in the anti-Eisenhower 
visit. 
Another part was played by the memory of his ef-
forts to restore authority to the police in late 1959. 
Too many remembered the pre-war days and half the nation's 
schools were closed by a teachers' walkout; Sohyo, the 
labor union alliance called strikes and demonstrations 
and the Socialists rioted in the Diet and tried to kid-
nap the speaker to prevent a vote. The bill had to be 
shelved--perhaps this was but a preview of events to 
come. 
Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II4 
Many months before the proposed Eisenhower trip 
to Japan, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur 
II warned '~oscow and Peking have made it abundantly 
4A summary on Ambassador MacArthur can be found 
in Time, February 1960. Also, the State Dept., Washington, 
D.C71Wrll provide a biography of any diplomat on request. 
clear that the neutralization and eventual take-over of 
Japan is their No. 1 objective in Asia." 
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No other country could have been more suitable 
for Douglas MacArthur II's first ambassadorial post than 
Japan. He should have become a military man by family 
tradition; however, on a courtesy visit aboard his 
father's ship (a Navy Captain) to Japan at age 13, 
MacArthur decided to become a diplomat, 
He graduated from Yale and in 1934 he married 
Laura Barkley, daughter of vice-president to be Alben 
Barkley. The next year he received his first Foreign 
Service appointment. He served well in Naples, in Vichy 
he led a cloak and dagger existence as contact man with 
French Resistance leaders and smuggler of downed Allied 
pilots. He was interned by the Nazis for 15 months. 
His big break came in 1951 when he was picked to 
accompany Eisenhower on a three week tour setting up 
NATO. He did so well that Eisenhower made him advisor 
on international affairs for SHAPE, and when Eisenhower 
went to the White House, MacArthur accompanied him as 
Counselor of the State Department under John Foster Dulles. 
He acquired his first major Asian experience by acting as 
Dulles' No. 2 man in the establishment of Seato. 
Shortly after establishing himself in Tokyo, 
MacArthur fell in with Kishi's insistence to change 
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Japan-u.s. relations to one of mutual trust. 
His first drive for mutual trust occurred in 1957 
when against opposition of u.s. military men, he argued 
that G.I. William Girard be tried in a Japanese court for 
his killing of a Japaneae woman (Girard got a three year 
suspended sentence). Another victory over the Pentagon 
was his securing a reduction of u.s. forces in Japan from 
100,000 to 50,000. He then began work with the Japanese 
Foreign Office on a revised Security Treaty. 
To offset Socialist cries for a complete break with 
"U.S. imperialims" MacArthur worked for a treaty highly 
favorable to Japan, which Kiahi could point to as proof 
that the u.s. and Japan were now equal partners. 
In 1958 negotiations were opened to revise the 
security treaty. A new clause was put in. It was sent 
to Emperor Hirohito by Kishi for confirmation on behalf of 
the Japaneae government. Emperor Hirohito confirmed the 
following clause contained in Prime Minister Kishi's let· 
tar. 
Maior changes in the deployment into Japan of 
Un ted States armed forceaL mator changes in their 
equipment, and the uae of taci ities and areas in 
Japan as baaea for military combat operations to 
be undertaken other than thoae conducted under 
Article V* of the aaid treaty, ahall be the aubjects 
*This article deals with an armed attack against 
either party in territories under the administration of 
Japan. It states that both parties would act in accordance 
with its constitutional provisions and processes and would 
report any attack to U.N. 
of prior consultation with the Government of 
Japan. 
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This clause did not give Japan full veto power; 
however, President Eisenhower assured Prime Minister Kishi 
that the U.S. would not act contrary to Japan's wishes. 
Kishi and Eisenhower published a joint communique attesting 
to this fact. 5 
A letter from Japan to the United States expressed 
concern for the defense of the islands administered by the 
U.S. and for which Japan possesses residual sovereignty, 
since the subject was not a subject of discussion in the 
course of treaty negotiations. Mr. Christian Herter, 
Secretary of Defense replied by letter of January 19, 1960 
In the event of an armed attack against these islands, 
the United States Government will consult at once 
with the Government of Japan and intends to take the 
necessary measurea for the defense of these islands, 
and to do its utmost to secure the welfare of the 
islanders. 
This was incorporated into the AGREED Minute To 
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 6 
5Tbe communique was published in all Japanese 
papers (both Japanese and English editions) in January of 
1960. 
6
"Full Texts: Japan-U.S, Treaty and Security 
Agreements," Securitl Treaty Supplement Pacific Stars and 
Stripes, June 21, 19 0. 
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The treaty also applied to cooperation between the 
two nations in political and economic matters, rather than 
solely the defense of Japan, Article II called on both 
parties to eliminate conflict in international economic 
policies and to encourage economic collaboration between 
them. 
After much negotiation (nearly two years) to form 
a treaty which would give new respect to Japan in the in-
ternational sphere, Prime Minister Kishi left for 
Washington in January 1960 to sign it. It was at this 
time that both countries agreed to have President Eisen-
hower visit Japan in June to help celebrate the centennial 
of Japan-u.s. relations. 7 
Initial Reaction in Japan to Revised Treaty 
The reaction to the revised security treaty is 
almost a duplicate of the earlier peace treaty debate. 
The main supporters of the revision was the Liberal-
Democratic Party, the business community, a portion of 
7Alex Campbell "Bonus to Be Wisely Spent," Time 
Magazine, January 25, i960. Also the Japanese papers---
announced President Eisenhower's forthcoming visit to 
Japan after both the Summit Conference and his trip to 
Moscow. 
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the bureaucracy and the conservatives in Japan. They ad-
vanced the case for limited armament and defense by saying 
the right to self defense and mutual security treaties is 
the inalienable right of any sovereign state. Japan can 
be truly independent, they argued, only if it possessed 
the means of self defense, and only under such conditions 
will its words carry any weight in international circles. 
They also asserted that since Communism does not really 
recognize neutralism or pacifism as legitimate, Japan as 
a neutral, pacifist country would be at the mercy of Com-
munist unilateral decisions. Security guarantees given 
by the Communists would be abrogated when it served the 
interests of the communist world. Supporters of self-
defense and the security treaty also argued that it was 
possible to develop a civilian-controlled defense force, 
properly indoctrinated (U.S: assistance groups) and not 
susceptible to the old militaristic desires. The support-
ers have joined the government in supporting the continu-
ance of American military bases. While it is true that some 
support had come f9r economic reasons--the American dollars 
expended in Japan in connection with such bases--the im-
portant arguments of the pro-treaty faction were political 
and military. If Japan rejects rearmament, it lacks the 
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the military capacity to defend itself. It must assist 
American forces willing to defend it by affording them 
installations and bases. Japan must contribute to the 
alliance, and in lieu of massive military might, her only 
possible military contribution is facilities. They de-
fended the treaty by arguing that war is less likely if a 
balance of power can be maintained, and that Japan has a 
vital role to play in maintaining that balance in Asia. 8 
8To understand the basic tenets of the supporters 
of the security treaty, one must study the political strug-
gles that preceded the adoption of the Constitution of 
1889. They reveal something of the complex process of in-
ternal adjustment among Japanese leaders and interest 
groups and the influence of modern political ideology upon 
the Japanese as individuals and as . Robert Wilson's 
, ideal-
am fenerated prior to the Restoration combined with the 
real stic concerns of power blocks to dictate the shape 
of Japan's first tentative constitutional government. 
George M. Beckmann's 
describes more 
tion of the Constitut , 
the Prussian model and pol~t~i~cial~~~~~MJ.~~ origin. Nobutake Ike's 
Democracy in JaRan , 
early "aemocratlc and points 
deep sources of popular desire for a more responsible 
government. Many pertinent periodical articles are listed 
in the bibliography. 
The non-supporters of the treaty fall into the 
more organized groups which shall be discussed later. 
The Japan Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the 
Socialist-Democratic Party, the Zengakuren (National 
Federation of Student Self-Government Associations), 
Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union), Sokyo (General Council 
of Trade Unions) were strongest among these. 
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To the anti-treaty factions, the basic issue was 
one of military alliance with the United States versus 
neutralism. The appeal of neutralism is not difficult 
to understand. World War II brought tremendous suffering 
and destruction. Even today the scars are omnipresent. 
Over 200,000 Japanese bear marks of the atomic bombings. 
There was a strong belief among the anti-treaty faction 
that with scientific-technological developments, war had 
become inconceivable for a society like Japan. They cited 
such facts as: Japan's population, approaching one hun-
dred million, along with the bulk of industry, is heavily 
concentrated in densely packed urban areas; these urban 
centers are only minutes away from Sino-Soviet bases; 
approximately eighty per cent of industrial raw materials 
and twenty per cent of food must be imported. Pacifism 
flourishes on such facts. 
Non-supporters recalled that pacifism was en-
couraged in the initial postwar period by American policy. 
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They found it puzzling that less than ten years after we 
insisted on total disarmament, we had begun to call for 
armament and military alliance. The reasons, of course, 
lie in the changed conditions in Asia and in the world, 
but some of the original American arguments have had 
continued effect. The futility and horror of war, the 
danger of a revived Japanese militarism, and the waste in-
volved in armament and alliance when social welfare 
measures were needed are the main arguments raised by the 
opponents of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
In addition to the general neutralist arguments, 
opponents insisted that the presence of American military 
bases in Japan would greatly increase the risk of Japan-
ese involvement in any Asian or global war. They further 
asserted that American bases on Japanese soil represented 
vestigial remains of the occupation and made it impossible 
for Japan to control her own foreign policy. For the 
leftists, the issue of "American imperialism" was a potent 
one while for the rightists the issue was "American 
dependence." The anti-treaty supporters also raised the 
elements of land alienation, noise and accidents, and 
G.I. incidents to such a hieght that military bases became 
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a controversial aspect of the alliance. 9 
Thus we see the opposing factions; anti-treaty for 
complete severance from America replaced by neutralism; 
pro-treaty for a full partnership with rather than sub-
ordination to the United States. 
9A better understanding of the anti-treaty faction 
is found in the historical perspective of how Japan cre-
ated the political and social order under which it became 
a world power and the extremist views in relation to it. 
In Edwin 0. Reischauer's Japan Past and Present, 2nd ed. (Tokyo; 1958), chap. IX, the interpretation of the com-
plex interation of internal conditions and the forces gen-
erated by political reform in all segments of Japanese 
society is the most convincing on the subject. 
Delmer Brown s (Berkeley, 1953) has 
attempted to te 's political extremism 
in terms of the expression latent nationalism. Maurius 
B. Jansen's The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, 1954) 
help clarify the o6scure connections between Japan's 
domestic power politics and its expansionist aspirations. 
It also gives the foundation for the present desire for 
Communist China reco~ition. Allan B. Cole's Japanese 
~Ef~~ii[;ffitE;.;:;;:.:::._ (Boston, 1956) indicates the neces-
s social groups and their interrela-
tionships to discern the anti-treaty movement in its 
historical perspective. 
PART TWO 
THE U.S, - JAPAN SECURITY TREATY STRUGGLE, 1960 
CHAPTER III 
THE SECURITY TREATY STRUGGLE 
In the United States the preoccupation with the 
much overplayed contest between Communism and Democracy 
has often resulted in little attention to the achieve-
ments and problems of post-war Japan. 
The United States idea of freedom is rooted in the 
conviction that, as a spiritual creature, the individual 
is of supreme worth; as a moral creature, he is responsible 
for his actions; as a rational creature, he is capable of 
governing himself. The people of the United States be-
lieved that Japan was truly democracized. Thus, when the 
riotous treaty struggle began and ended with the cancella-
tion of President Eisenhower's planned visit to Japan, 
they were shocked. They felt Japan had failed in democratic 
practices and that Communism and sympathy for Communism 
were the main reasons for the struggle. The mass media of 
America perpetrated this theory. However, to dismiss the 
deep emotional uncertainty in Japan over neutralism as a 
"Communist plot" is dangerous oversimplification. 
Sympathy for Communism was only partly responsible 
for the antagonism toward the pact and for the riots which 
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forced the withdrawal of President Eisenhower's invita-
tion. Equally contributing forces were the growing anti-
Kishi sentiment, the handling of the various incidents by 
the press, and such social factors as the disappearance 
of the old order with its unifying themes and the insecur-
ity within the new setting a generation adrift. Tensions 
and insecurity in a new way of life characterize a large 
element of the population--not yet entirely converted to 
responsible democracy. 
During the negotiating phase of the treaty a 
crisis failed to materialize in Japan, despite Communist 
China's attempt to create one internally. 1 The Peking 
Review of May 13, 1958 said that: 
Japan, in short, is approaching the brink of an 
inevitable crisis . . . the Kishi government has 
initiated a fascist policy of suppression and 
persecution. 
The Chinese Communists chose Kishi as the symbol 
of the rebirth of evil in Japan, the evil that Japanese 
were opposing. On May 27, 1958 the Peking Review said: 
Kishi is not only suppressing the progressive 
forces and strangling democratic freedom in 
Japan, but also harbors imperialist designs 
against other countries. 
1 J.L. Anderson, "Squall Over Japan," America, 
December 13, 1958. 
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The Peoples Daily, the Pravda of Communist China 
added on November 1, 1958: 
Nobusuke Kishi bas once again exposed his imperi-
alist face. His is a grim imperialist visage 
which is no different from Hideki Tojo. 
Thus continued Communist China's propaganda battle 
against the treaty using Kishi as their scapegoat. They 
were still smarting from his refusal to trade based on 
their price offers. 2 They logically portrayed Kishi as 
pro-militaristic. In 1959 their propaaanda was bolstered 
when Secretary General of the Japan Socialist Party, 
tnehiro Asanuma made a "U,S, imperialilm" statement while 
visitins China. This was later to aid in Pekin& propa-
aanda as Asanuma never repudiated the atatement. 3 
In Japan the first treaty demonatration was held 
on November 27, 1959 by the People's Council aaainst the 
Revision of the Security Treaty, Twelve thousand people 
participated in the orderly and quiet demonstration~ It 
sained national attention only when the nowapapers re-
ported that Asanuma had led it, Later, it was proved he 
was only a late obaerver. 
2 See p. 23, Ch. It. 
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Prime Minister Kishi went to Washington in Janu-
ary, 1960 to sign the treaty. 5 Seven hundred Zegakuren 
students rioted at Haneda airport. 6 He returned to Japan 
and presented the treaty to the Lower House of the Diet 
(House of Representatives) in February. Kishi's party, 
the Liberal Democrats, had 283 seats in the Lower House 
and the Socialists and Democratic Socialists, 162. 7 There-
fore, routine debate was anticipated in the House for 
several months with an expected ratification. 
In these next few months several more demonstra-
tiona took place. These were organized and supported by 
the left and Communist money and involved some unions and 
a minority of students. 8 No popular support could be 
mustered for the cause and even with outside propaganda 
no major crisis developed, 
5Daebetsi Suzuki, "What the West Can Learn from 
the East," Contemporary Japan, Nov•mber-December, 1959. 
6op. cit., January 15, 1960 (news coverage). 
7Edward P. Whittemore, The Press in Japan Today (Columbia: University of South earoi!na Press, 1961), 
p. 46. 
~.H. Martin, "Turbulent Tokyo," Readers Digest, 
Vol. 76, March, 1960, p. 146. 
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Catalyst to the Struggle 
The entire situation suddenly came alive to all 
pacifistic Japan with the U-2 incident and the subsequent 
handling of it by the United States. Japan expected 
President Eisenhower to do wonders at the summit confer-
ence and then after his visit to Moscow to arrive in 
Japan as a peacemaker. The U-2 affair changed this. The 
summit was a failure; Eisenhower's trip to Moscow was can-
celled. 
Russia sent Japan a note on May 20, 1960 protest-
ing the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and warned Japan 
against allowing its territory to be used as bases for 
the U.S. military aircraft which, according to the Soviets, 
carried out reconnaissance and provocations against the 
Soviet government. 9 
Shortly thereafter, a U-2 based in Japan and 
painted all black was forced to make an emergency landing 
near Haneda Airport, Tokyo, Japan. When the U-2 landed, 
U.S. military police and some in plain clothes surrounded 
the plane and kept all reporters away with the threat of 
guns. This was played up in Japanese papers and quite 
9The Yomiuri, The Asahi, The Mainichi, The Japan 
~~~and the Pacific Stars and Stripes, Tokyo: Japan 
r coverage--morning and evening editions) May 21, 1960. 
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naturally led the citizenry to ponder whether the planes 
really were used for weather reconnaissance. The three 
Japan based U-2's were removed at the request of the 
Japanese government. u.s. Japan relations suffered a set-
back because of this loss of trust. 10 
The Anti-Treaty Movement Grows 
The Hiroshima "ban the bomb" group began to demon-
strate against the treaty. 
Peking stepped up its anti-treaty, anti-Kishi 
propaganda. Its new line was that the people of Japan op-
posed the treaty and the sovernment was defying the people 
by intending to use the treaty to rebuilt Japanese mili-
tarism. Demonstrations increased as a type of panic 
against getting Japan into another war continued to 
build up. 
It was at this point that Kishi used what was 
later considered poor tactics to get the security treaty 
passed. On the evening of May 19, the Socialists, know-
ing Kishi wanted to call for a vote, rioted in the legis-
lative ball. They barricaded the Speaker of the House, 
Icbiro Kiyose, in his office so the House could not begin 
session. The speaker after giving several warnings called 
lOibid., May 23, 1960. 
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in 500 police. While the melee was going on, the Speaker 
called the session to order. Then the Socialists and 
anti-treaty faction of Kishi's own party boycotted the 
session. Since Kishi knew he still had a majority vote 
he brought the treaty to a surprise vote and it went 
through. According to Japanese constitution, the treaty 
would become law after 30 days whether the House of 
Councillors approved it or not. 11 
The Power of the Press 
After the forced vote the treaty struggle inten-
sified overnight and the Japanese press, especially the 
big three, played an important role in it. They really 
shaped the events to follow. In order to understand the 
part the press played one must first understand the 
Japanes press. 12 
11Ibid., May 20, 1960. All editions. 
lZA full coverage of the place of the press in 
Japan can be found in various books dealing with the 
periods in Japanese history. It is necessary to make a 
comparative view of the press during the Meiji reforma-
tion, the periods of liberal democratic trend~ of na-
tionalism and militarism, of the war years, of the occupa-
tion and post-occupation to understand its place and 
peculiar position today. A few books that cover this 
abely are: Edwin 0. Reischauer's, Japan Past and Present, 
Arthur Tiedman's (New Jersey, 1955), Russel 
Brine's tt, N.Y., 1948) and 
Mark Hill, 1955). 
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In Japan today there are 37 million newspapers sold 
each day; Japan is one of the most newpaper conscious coun-
tries in the world. There are three main daily papers dis-
tributed nationally which account for 19 million papers. 
These papers, the Asahi, Mainichi and Yomiuri have both 
morning and evening editions and are published simultane-
ously all over the country. The Japanese press is inde-
pendent with no government interference and they strive 
toward the highest interests of libertarian journalism. 
In no other country with freedom of opinion is there such 
a concentration of influence in the public media. Thus, 
one can discern the potential power of the press. 13 
In pre-war days the press was under such authori-
tarian censorship, it now tends to consider government its 
greatest enemy and most newspapers are hostile to the 
government. This in itself is an unusual situation. 
There seems to be an unspoken creed that all political 
parties should be equally criticized, but the government 
party more equally than others. To them this is democracy 
--freedom of the press in action. Unbiased reporting is 
measuring all political parties and personalities against 
an ideal and any who deviate from this ideal are criticized 
13whittemore, op. cit., p. 3. 
41 
Another unusual aspect of the press is its lack 
of defining responsibility for its actions" Previously, 
anything that went wrong was not the responsibility of 
the Emperor, but of the leaders who advised him" Now the 
press feels it is a question of the responsibility being 
that of the government party or the people who elect ito 
The press said the majority party held two-thirds of the 
seats in the Diet, thus two-thirds of all responsibility 
was theirs. The press blamed Kishi and his government 
for most actions during the treaty struggle, even though 
the press itself urged demonstrations, strikes, etc" 
against the Kishi regime. 14 
The role played by the press in this struggle was 
in four main stages: coverage of the forced vote on the 
treaty, the campaign against Kishi and the Conservative 
government, partial support of the opposition and implicit 
support of demonstrations and the treatment of President 
Eisenhower's scheduled visit. 
Forced vote coverageo••Japanese believe social 
contracts are multilateral or non-existent. The majority 
and minority represent the public and must adjust to 
14Ibid. 
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agreement. Separately, they represent only partial in-
complete opinions. There always exists the pact of ad-
justment. Whether either party breaks it (the govern-
ment party majority by refusing to compromise and forcing 
the vote) isn't as important as the fact that the Diet's 
actions has not represented the people's will because of 
lack of representative totality. Hence, the charges of 
"tyranny of the majority" and unilateral treaty vote were 
hurled at Kishi. The press was emotional and called 
Kishi's act unethical and un-Japanese. They slanted 
their stories for Socialist sympathy. They were emotional 
in their emphasis of the introduction of police into the 
Diet to expel the minority party charging that such ends 
could not justify the means. 15 Sentiment against Kishi 
and the failure to adjust was so strong the Japanese 
press neglected to inform its readers how much better the 
revised treaty would be for Japanese national and interna-
tional interest. They failed in responsible reporting. 
The Campaign against Kishi.--At this point the 
' 
treaty ceased to be the issue. The methods used by Kishi 
to secure the Diet vote made him the central issue in the 
The Mainichi and The 
coverage of the forced 
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press. They believed Kishi responsible for breaking 
the pact of adjustment; therefore, the other party was 
free to act. Demonstrations of the Diet, according to 
the press, were not attacks on the national government, 
for the Diet ceased being national when its pact of to-
tality was broken. After all, the press reasoned, the 
Japanese word for democracy was demokurashi and everyone 
knew that in Japanese demo meant demonstrations and 
Kurashi, living; thus, democracy was "living by demon-
stration" or a legitimate show of antagonism toward 
the government. 
The anti-Kishi campaign by the press was of a 
dual nature: against the man and against the order, They 
neglected their duty of presenting all positions by lead-
ing the campaign of direct action16 or resignation of his 
16Robert A. Scalapino, Democrac~ and the Party 
Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 195 ); Walter Scott 
Perry, "Yoshino Sakuzo 1873-1933: Exponent of Democratic 
Ideals in Japan" (1956; University Microfilm Publication 
17,734)); Bernards. Silberman, "The Political Theory and 
Program of Yoshino Sakuzo," Journal of Modern History, 
XXXI (Dec. 1959), 310-24; Douglas H. Mendel Jr., "Ozaki 
Yukio: Political Conscience of Modern Japan," Far Eastern 
~uarterly, XV (May, 1956), 343-56; Arthur E. Tiedemann, 
The Hamaguchi Cabinet: First Phase, July 1929-Feb. 1930" (University Microfilms, 1959). These studies have demon-
strated how conditions in Japan fostered the use of direct 
action as a means of expressing political opposition to 
the vested interests. 
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cabinet and himself en masse. By direct action the press 
meant the threat of violence for which the Kishi govern-
ment would be responsible. The preconceived idea of the 
press that public opinion was unanimous was incorrect. 
While trying to defend democratic unbiased reporting, 
they still adhered to their traditional desire for total-
ity or conformity. 
Partial support of opposition and implicit support 
of demonstrations.--On May 26, 1960 the press supported a 
nationwide or united action against the Kishi government 
and the treaty. After this action the press. strongly sup-
ported both the opposition and its tactis. They exagger-
ated the size of demonstrations and the number of partici-
pants. It was at this point that the press emphasized the 
fact that the treaty became effective the day of President 
Eisenhower's arrival in Japan. They charged the visit 
was but an effort of Kishi's to bolster his declining 
government. They quoted American periodicals in support 
of the charge. They failed to mention the trip had been 
planned before the forced vote even though the dates had 
been changed. During the period from May 26, 1960 to 
June 4, 1960 press propaaandizina in news and editorials 
was moat severe. Presa coveraae reached its peak in 
covering the June 4 united action and general strike 
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called to force the resignation of the Kishi government. 
Just prior to the June 4 major strike and demon-
* strations the Japan Congress of Journalists, rather than 
joining the strike issued an appeal to their members: 
Let us now answer the expectations of the masses 
on June 4 with our news stories! Let newspapers 
carry the voice of the people who are giving sup-
port to the strike.l7 
All papers covered the event, but none faced the issue of 
the strike's illegality, since by law public workers can-
not strike for political purposes (Public Workers Law). 18 
The press supported the opposition and its tactics 
reaching a peak June 4, 1960 and wavering until June 10, 
1960 and the riotous attack on James Hagerty, President 
Eisenhower's press secretary at Haneda airport. Then 
came a new assessment by the press. 
Treatment of President Eisenhower's scheduled 
visit.--On June 10, James Hagerty, press secretary to 
President Eisenhower arrived in Japan to make final trip 
* Members of the International Organization of 
Journalists with headquarters in Prague. Of the 1600 
members of the J.C.J. 1200 are located in Tokyo. 
17 Whittemore, op. cit., p. 62. 
l8Japan Public Workers Law. Department of State 
Publication 2836, Far Eastern Series 22 (Washington 1957). 
46 
arrangements. He was met at Haneda airport by Ambassador 
MacArthur. The two attempted to drive back to Tokyo but 
before they left the airport, the were surrounded by 
Japanese who carried placards which announced "Go Home Ike" 
and amid singing of .the International• were heard shouts 
of "Go Home Yanchi."19 The demonstration was so vehement 
that a Marine helicopter had to rescue the men. The attack 
on Hagerty was the first sign of anti-Americanism. It was 
led by the anti-leadership (affiliated with the Japan 
Communist Party) wing of the Zengakuren. The leadership 
wing (Trotskyites) were not there as they had no interest 
in an anti-American campaign. The press recognized this; 
they became aware that the Leftist campaign had taken a 
definite planned shift different from the one they had 
supported in their focus against Kishi. 
On June 15, 1960 another Nationwide united action 
waa called for. The worat riot of the entire campaign 
took place in the Diet. 20 Thouaanda of studenta from all 
l9a,P. Marlin, "Japan After 15 Years, the American 
Way, But Anti •American Violence, .. ". sflruiLfi~:::.{ Vol. 48, 
June 20, 1960 ··; Japan 
Misjudged: 
20Japanese news coverage of the event: The Asahi, 
The Japan Times, The Mainichi and The Yomiuri newspapers (morning and evening editions) June 16, 196o. 
Editorial comment: Yasuhara Honda "Hatred Clashed 
with Hatred in the Diet Violence," The Yomiuri, June 17, 
1960; "Thomasu: . Story of Youth and Brutality," The Yomiuri, 
June 17, 1960, "The Red's War of Riots," U.S. News and World 
Report, June 26, 1960. 
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over Japan clashed with the police who for the first time 
were given full power. The police wore crash helmets, 
used pressure hoses, and also night sticks. Front-line 
students could not turn and flee the police onslaught as 
other students rushed forward. The action was centered 
as much against Eisenhower's arrival as anti-government 
campaign. Four hundred persons were injured and one fe-
male student killed as a result of the riot. The press 
reported without bias and began to call for both sides 
to reflect dispassionately for their actions. The began 
to see that the Socialist party and its members and fol-
lowers had lost their independence and were being used 
by those who made violence their creed. 
The Yomiuri column in the evening edition June 
16, 1960 was even more accurate. Better than any other 
article during the treaty struggle, it described the 
dangers of the relativistic approach of the press (and 
much of the public) which confused motive with effect. 
On June 17, 1960 President Eisenhower's trip to 
Japan was cancelled. The combination of the June 15 
rioting and cancellation of Eisenhower's trip caused for 
the first time all papers reporting equally--pointing 
out how the sequence of events had been of service to the 
Communist bloc. Riot and international incident were 
needed to overcome the obsessional preoccupation aE the 
press to Kishi's downfall. 
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On June 19, 1960 the supposed date of President 
Eisenhower's arrival, the treaty became automatically ap-
proved by the Diet. Thus, even though the rioters had 
the trip cancelled Kishi won by having the treaty rati-
fied. The press in one month had run the full gamet 
from violent indignation to apprehension to complacency 
to support for illegal strikes to utter shock and back to 
indignation, but this time not directed solely against 
the government. 21 
The role of the press in the U.S.-Japan security 
treaty struggle can beat be described by the following: 
The "non-partisan" principle of the Japanese 
press is admirable, but since such powerful news-
papers can never be politically detached, it is 
also unrealistic. In practice the "independent" 
position of the three national dailies lead to 
advocacies that are almost purely !£ h2£, and such 
sudden headlong causes are in turn unusually sus-
ceptible to emotion and to prejudices inherited 
from the past. The emotion generally takes the 
form of a hunger for affixing responsibility for 
society's malaise; the preiudice moat often evi-
dent is the "unbiased" ant government bias. To-
gether this emotion and this prejudice can lead · 
the press to subvert the democratic cause it pro-
fesses, as it did during the treaty struggle. 
The emotion is unseemly in responsible journalism, 
2111Two Edged Sword," The Yomiuri, editorial, 
July 2, 1960. 
the prejudices out of place in post-war Japan. 
In technical and intellectual competence Japan's 
national papers rank high among the world's free 
presses, but their service in a democracy is 
endangered by these two weaknesses. 
. . . the emotional reaction of the press 
to police intervention, considering Japan's re-
cent history, is understandable, but that does 
not excuse the colored reporting of the May 19 
Diet vote ..•. fear of government--rightist 
collusion cannot excuse distorted coverage of 
right-wing activities or failure to note the 
collusion of Left-wing activities with a cam-
paign abetted by a foreign power. Editorially, 
a newspaper is free to conduct any legal cam-
paign and adopt any responsible position it 
wishes. The campaign against the Kishi govern-
ment was, of course, in itself legal, but con-
doning an illegal strike because it is oppor-
tune is at the very least irresponsible. The 
Japanese press, like Japanese society, is among 
the most free in the world. It is more free not 
only because it is unhampered by coercion or 
repressive laws, but because it is undeterred 
by the sense of restraint that comes with ex-
perience in freedom. A study of the role of 
the Japanese press in the treaty struggle 
indicates only too clearly that it understands 
its freedom, but not its responsibility.22 
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It is a sad fact that most of the demonstrators 
honestly thought they were practicing democracy--rule by 
the people, as America taught it to them. To comprehend 
how a people could delude themselves into such thinking 
requires one to delve into the people who made up the 
anti-treaty faction in Japan. 
22whittemore, ~o~p~·-c~i~t~., p. 36. 
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Zengakuren 
This group supported to some extent every major 
and minor demonstration held during the treaty struggle. 
Why? Were its members so anti-American or were they pro-
Japan? Just what is the Zengakuren? 23 Some say it is a 
creature of democracy gone astray. It is the National 
Federation of Student Self-Government Associations organ-. 
ized in 1948 to protect academic freedom and democracy. 
Most of the hard-core group of leaders have been thrown 
out of the Japan Communist Party for being so radical 
(they are true Trotskyites or Bolsheviks). 
During the past ten years Zengakuren has been 
responsible for May Day riots, locking university profes-
sors in their offices, and demonstrations that paralyzed 
traffic and caused property damage. All of its policy is 
against lining up with either power bloc. The youth have 
as their ideal to become a mediator between the two--to be 
a neutral country with a form of Marxism adaptable to 
Japan. They oppose the peace treaty, Japan's defense 
forces, nuclear tests, U.S. bases and the security pact. 
They yearn for world peace. They want to recognize 
Communist China since they feel ignoring it is to invite 
2~. Cooper, "Zengakuren: Leftism Run Riot," 
American, Vol. 103, June 25, 1960. 
its wrath--a rocket could hit Japan in a matter of min-
utes. 
They also feel U.S. ties make it impossible to 
live up to the "no-war" clause of the constitution. 
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Along with this feeling for peace, Kishi is most dis-
trusted since he served in Tojo's war cabinet and signed 
the declaration of war. They are suspicious of Kishi's 
motives and aspirations and feel he was trying to remili-
tarize Japan and gain complete control of the central 
government. 
With all his forced democracy the student tries 
tothink and act according to his judgment but tradition 
thwarts him. 24 Parents still hold the financial lever-
age and status to make him accept their decisions. Their 
social situation often determines the kind of job avail-
able to him; that is, when he can find a job. Thousands 
of students commit suicide every year because there are 
too many people trying to fill too few jobs. And when 
he does get a job, he is again thwarted by tradition. 
Employment examinations are held every fall throughout the 
24p.F. Drucker, "Baffled Young Men of Japan," 
Harper, January 1961; P, Schmid, "Japan's Lost Generation," 
CommentarQ, Vol. 23, May, 1957; ''Why Students Stage Riots," 
Businesseek, June 25, 1960; Jean Stoetzel, Without the 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, a study of youth in Post-
War Japan (N.Y. 1955). 
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nation for students who will graduate and start working 
the following spring. Initial employment is based strictly 
on educational background. An employment contract is con-
sidered by employee and employer alike as a lifetime con-
tract and the worker is trained for a permanent future in 
the company from the beginning of his employment until he 
retires. Changing jobs to better oneself or for higher 
wages is unthinkable. Future progress in the company is 
based on the "Nenko-Joretsu" system. Translated, this 
means a system in which the order of value is decided ac-
cording to the length of service. In other words the in-
come of the Japanese employee throughout his career is 
based upon his age or length of service rather than upon 
his ability or the results he may be able to produce. 25 
Thus, is it any wonder students join organizations 
like Zengakuren to bring their protests and grievances to 
the attention of the government and those who rule their 
lives? They demonstrate to unleash disillusionment and 
frustration, but most of all to be finally heard. 
25n. Brown, "Hopes, Heartaches and Hari-Kari," 
Senior Scholastic, Vol. 76, February 3, 1960; Edwin 0. 
Reiscbauer, Japan Past and Present (Tokyo, 1957), p. 244, 
and an interview with Mr. Mitsue Ohta, President of the 
Tokyo Handcraft Co. who owns and operates six factories 
under the "Nenko-Joretsu" system, May 13, 1960. 
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Then, too, they are preached at in their classes 
and often encouraged by instructors to skip class for po-
litical demonstrations. This situation is a result of 
* SCAP educational reforms. These reforms were directed 
by men so devoted to Dewey doctrine, they failed to recog-
nize that Japan's youth didn't need to learn to adjust 
to the shattered society around them, but needed to be 
provided with a faith to replace the one Japan had lost. 
The reform tried to fill Japan's schools with educators 
opposed to pre-war policy. Thus, they were encouraged 
to revert to their Marxist beliefs held in the 1920's. 
In fact today Nikkyoso, the Japanese teacher's union, 
is Marxist--but a Marxism adaptable to Japan. 26 
Soh yo 
Another organization where the American idea of 
democracy hasn't worked out is in the labor unions, 27 
* Supreme Commander Allied Powers--reforms under-
taken and enforced during the occupation of Japan. 
25 Reischauer, op. cit., p. 265. 
27Ibid., pp. 242-245. For an analysis of the par-
ticular social conditions which affected industrial manage-
ment and labor organization see James C. Abegglen's, 
The Ja nese Factor : As ects of its Social Or anization 
str a 
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especially Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions) which 
played such a large part in the demonstrations. The union 
concept of working for labor objectives has been over-
shadowed by the concept of labor as a political instru-
ment. Many of the labor-leaders are Marx-oriented and 
think in terms of the "class-struggle." The unions have 
concentrated on the big industries and government workers 
and completely neglected nearly 10 million workers in 
small companies. Howeve~ it is a misconception to label 
all Sohyo Communist because they sing the "Internationale." 
This tune is the battle hymn of labor organizations, 
trade unions and student organizations who want a neutral 
Japan. Toward the end of the demonstrations the press 
finally recognized Sohyo's position and called for an 
end to political strikes by labor unions, branding them 
as illegal. It surmised that constant repetition of 
strikes called solely for political purposes would not 
only result in the victimization of unionists taking part, 
but would also alienate the general public--the press 
went so far as to say that the political strike is basically 
a weapon opposed to parli~entarianism. This was an "about 
face" for a press that had encouraged strikes and demon-
strations against the Kishi government. Sohyo held a 
strong position in the anti-treaty struggle, for without 
its support, the use of nation-wide strikes would have 
failed. 
Socialist Party 
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The Socialist Party had long been against a U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty in any form. They had agreed to the 
terms of the peace treaty in 1952, but even then opposed 
the security pact. They supported a neutral, non militar-
istic Japan free to move and trade within any sphere. 
They have opposed Kishi throughout his premiership on 
these points; thus, when the question of security treaty 
revision came up, they recognized the opportunity. 28 
Perhaps, the single most damaging action against 
the future treaty struggle was committed by Secretary-
General Asanuma in 1959 during a Socialist-Communist 
visit to Peking. While there he signed a statement which 
read, "U.S. imperialism is the common enemy of the 
Japanese and Chinese. peoples." This statement was used 
over and over in the propaganda campaign conducted by both 
28The Socialist movement in Japan can be put into 
proper historical and analytical perspective by such works 
as: Evelyn Colbert, The Left Wi~ in Japanese Politics (New York, 1952); Walter w. McLaren, A Po11t1cai History 
of Ja an Duri the Mai i Era 1867-1912 (Londo~ 1916); 
o ert K. e sc auer, Japan: overnment and Politics 
(New York, 1939); Robert Scaiaplno, Democrac~ and the 
Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 19 3). 
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Communist China and Russia. Asanuma never repudiated the 
statement, 29 even though his party's stand during the 
"attempted sabotage" of Eisenhower's trip was that they 
had Japanese-American relations at heart. They claimed 
that the President's presence in Japan at that time of 
domestic risis would damage the ties between the two 
countries. While this claim was but a tack of the party, 
many non-leftist, pro-American factions agreed with the 
claim. Engendering such agreement made it easier for the 
Socialists to oppose President Eisenhower's visit and to 
use such manipulation of the visit to attempt to gener-
ate an anti-American feeling. 
Socialist Democratic Party 
The Socialist-Democratic Party has always opposed 
both the peace treaty and the security pact. In fact, 
the party is really a break-off of the Socialist Party. 
In 1952 when the peace treaty was signed, a faction of the 
Socialist Party wanted Japan to retain some of its posses-
sions and bitterly opposed an occupation. When the Party 
denounced this faction of ultra nationalists, the faction 
29 See p. 35, Ch. III. 
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formed its own party, 30 Suehiro Nishio the leader, and 
his party are ultra-rightists. They believe in no out-
side guidance; Japan is for the Japanese. They viewed 
Eisenhower's visit as advantageous to Kishi, since the 
treaty would be automatically ratified the day he arrived, 
The trip would strongly bolster the Kishi government which 
to their view was not nationalistic enough. The rightist 
students often clashed bitterly with the leftist students 
causing some of the moat bitter riots in Tokyo. 
Japan Communist Party 
The Japanese Communist Party was purged during 
Japan's pre-war and war days, After Japan's war defeat, 
SCAP had all political prisoners freed and allowed all 
parties. Thus the JCP grew so stong and began to enter 
unions, press, etc. to the point that even SCAP bad to 
put restraints on it. The unique aspect of JCP is that 
they are permitted to take a different party line than 
Peking and Moscow. They try to make the party purely a 
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Japanese answer to trying timeso 31 
During the treaty struggle the JCP organized all 
of the early demonstrations and paid demonstrators for 
their participation. They did the same later and had key 
men inciting all elements in Japan where unrest was al-
ready brewing. They supported the propaganda campaigns 
from Russia and Communist China and it has been said 
that many of their efforts in Japan were financed by 
those countries. It was not unusual to see waitresses 
and other Japanese workers from u.s. military installa-
tions participate in strikes and demonstrations. In ask-
ing them for their reason, one usually received an answer 
that they weren't anti-American, but got paid to demon-
strate. No amount of talking could make them see that by 
participating and accepting money, morally and ethically, 
they were anti-American. Such discussions usually ended 
in the participant taking great offense at such a sug-
gestion. 
The Communist Party realizes that pressures from 
without and from the economic system within result in an 
in 
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internal instability in Japan. They aspire with the help 
of external pressures to force the people back into the 
pre-war totalitarian mold, this time with communist rather 
than nationalist symbolism. 
Summary 
The treaty struggle culminating in the cancella-
tion of President Eisenhower's visit was one of the most 
successful political warfare operations in recent times. 
For the first time in history the head of a major power was 
prevented from visiting an allied country by organized and 
illegal mob action. This would not have been possible had 
not the basic issues been confused and conscientious 
people used for ends they thought were democratic. The 
first necessity after this experience was for the Japan-
ese people to renew their faith in the fundamentals of 
freedom and responsible democracy. Democracy had not 
been tried and found wanting. It had merely been tried 
and found difficult. The task now before the Japanese 
government and the Japanese press is not to make it easy, 
but to make responsible democracy understood. It can be 
defended and preserved only in the way that it can be 
served and fulfilled--by the will and wisdom of free and 
responsible men. 
PART THREE 
A MILITARY CASE STUDY 
CHAPTER IV 
MILITARY NEED: FRONT LINE AMBASSADORS 
The great change in postwar American·-Japanese re-
lations has centered on this fact: before 1945, cultural 
exchange was limited to the few; after 1945, because of 
the occupation, it was conducted on a mass basis with hun-
dreds of thousands of people of both societies having an 
unusual opportunity to see each other at work and play, to 
observe each other's customs and idiosyncrasies, and con-
stantly to compare Japanese and American patterns. Seldom 
have two such different peoples been put together on such 
a large scale for so long a period of time. The results 
have been more favorable and rewarding to both countries 
than one could dare to hope. 
There are, of course, other aspects to the picture. 
Presently, and at any time when a U.S. military establish-
ment is based on foreign soil, there exist many causes for 
annoyance and even antagonism on both sides. These are 
duly exploited by those who have a vested interest in ill 
will. The majority of military personnel in Japan have 
been and are young and thus subject to the usual tempta-
tions. On the whole, they have acted well, but it is 
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inevitable that a certain number of incidents occur. The 
way in which these incidents are handled by both military 
and Japanese authorities and subsequently treated by the 
press and received by the public determine, to a great ex-
tent, the relations between the Japanese and Americans. 
Incidents, the use of large acreages for U.S. military 
bases and facilities, noise and accidents have helped to 
make military bases the most controversial aspect of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. 
In 1960, there were 101,080 military personnel, 
their dependents and the civilian component associated with 
the military residing in Japan. 1 This large American popu-
lation in Japan indicates, in part, the tremendous poten-
tial for creating impressions, good or bad, among the 
Japanese people. These service connected people consti-
tuted an important factor in determining the Japanese 
attitude toward the United States. Therefore, in 1960 as 
today, one of the prime military objectives is to ensure 
that these personnel are aware of their roles as "front-
line ambassadors. 112 
United 
1sase Population Report, J-1 Division, Headquarters 
States Forces Japan,~pril 30, 1960. 
2N.F. Twining, "Needed: Front-Line Ambassadors," 
National Parent-Teacher, December, 1954, p. 24. 
General Nathan F. Twining, when he was Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force noted that: 
Today more than ever before in history, our for-
eign policy and our national security must rely 
heavily on American servicemen and women to make 
friendsfor us abroad, Men and women in the uni-
forms of the armed services (and their dependents) 
are our frontline ambassadors •.•. Whether they 
know it or not, every day they carry out diplo-
matic negotiations in their contacts with foreign 
civilians.3 
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The problems that prohibit or hinder smooth and 
harmonious relations abroad are essentially the same as 
those in the states, but with added sources of friction 
that stem from differences in our standard of living, a 
mutual ignorance of one another's customs and the lan-
guage barrier. These sources of friction can lead to 
misunderstandings and poor judgments which have the po-
tential of deteriorating into catastrophes, especially 
during a period such as the U,S.-Japan Security Treaty 
struggle in 1960. 
More important in determining the cause of the 
sources of friction is the attitude of the personnel 
serving at overseas bases. These personnel can usually 
be divid•d into three groups: the positive or those who 
anticipate the assignment as an opportunity and learning 
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experience; the indifferent, who don't particularly care 
either way and the negative group who are there because 
of orders, It follows then that dependents often adopt 
the same attitude. The second group who really have no 
firm attitudes about the assignment can be persuaded to 
adopt the positive attitude through a good public rela-
tions program. The third group is usually interested in 
making everything as nearly a copy of the United States as 
possible. They make no attempt to learn the language or 
customs, treat foreign servants with contempt, compare 
everything to America and in general, belittle all things 
Japanese. Children of such persons usually reflect the 
condescending and often antagonistic attitude of their 
parents and thus serve to negate their natural abilities 
for making friends, 
Even though one of the prime military objectives 
is to ensure that service connected personnel are aware 
of their roles as "front-line ambassadors,"4 it is gen-
erally accepted that a complete success of this objective 
will not be achieved, However, a well organized and 
4 Ibid., p. 24. 
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conscientiously administered information program5 can help 
achieve the objectives, surmount problems surrounding the 
objective, enforce, analyze and change attitudes pertain-
ing to the objective. 
As an Air Force officer,. this writer will primarily 
stress those information programs with which she was asso-
ciated during her tour of overseas duty in Japan. The 
emphasis will be focused on the Air Force, particularly 
the 1st Weather Wing information programs already in ex-
istence as well as those arising from the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty struggle. 
5The Air Force information program can be compared 
to a public relations program. The title is the only dif-
ference. 
CHAPTER V 
1st WEATHER WING; 
MISSION LOCATION ORGANIZATION 
The 1st Weather Wing Headquarters under the USAF 
Air Weather Service, a Military Air Transport Service 
component is located at Fuchu Air Station Japan. While our 
primary interest is in the Headquarter's information pro-
gram, it is necessary to understand its mission, location 
(both headquarters and areas that house its personnel), 
and organization. 
Mission 
The 1st Weather Wing is the weather watchdog of the 
Pacific serving five military masters. The Wing of nearly 
1,000 personnel in 21 detachments and nine satellite de-
tachments is scattered across the Pacific from Japan to 
Hawaii to the Philippines, swinging east to encompass the 
Marianas and Bonin Islands, the Ryukus and Korea. 
The 1st Weather Wing is dynamically active in 
weather matters, supplying meteorological services to the 
Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Far East, U.S. Army Pacific 
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and others. It is active in international weather activ-
ities, conducts training of weathermen from allies of the 
United States in the Pacific area and is in close con-
stant cooperation and coordination with all U.S. military 
services. Because of its geographical location, the 1st 
Weather Wing provides typhoon warning service in addition 
to regular weather chores. 
With a continuing demand for weather data to sup-
port the constant air operations and training exercises 
in the Pacific and the Far East, the 1st Weather Wing 
Scientific and Climatological Services with its staff of 
graduate-trained meteorologists, becomes a key spot in 
the Wing's mission. S. & C.S. has the primary responsibil-
ity of providing data for forecasts exceeding 72 hours. 
Handicapped by the thin network of weather stations, 
climatological studies become even more important. An-
other feature of the s. & C.S. is the consultant visit 
program. Operating on an informal system, the consultants 
visit the detachments within the Wing at least twice a 
year--seeking, probing and exploring for new methods to 
improve the forecasting service. 
The Operations Section, evaluates the weather 
product of the Wing's subordinate units by a system of 
performance analysis, a progressive approach to obtain 
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quality in the end product. 7 
Location 
Fuchu Air Station is the home of the 1st Weather 
Wing. The 6100th Support Wing located at Tachikawa Air 
Base with liaison functions at Fuchu is responsible for 
the smooth operation of the base and provides adminis-
trative and logistical support to all assigned and at-
tached units. 1st Weather Wing is a tenant unit and as 
such is attached to the 6100th for support. Fuchu also 
houses Headquarters Fifth Air Force, United States Forces 
Japan and several other headquarters elements. Apart 
from Fuchu Air Station, but assigned to the 6100th Sup-
port Wing are "off-base" housing facilities of Fuchu Air 
Station at which many 1st Weather Wing personnel live. 
Fuchu Air Station is located on the western out-
skirts of Tokyo, appro~imately 18 miles from the heart of 
the city. Travel time to downtown Tokyo is approximately 
one hour by automobile or electric train. 
Covering 150 acres, Fuchu Air Station has 208 
buildings, 96 miscellaneous structures and a heliport. 
71st Weather Wing Regulation 20-1, Headquarters 
1st Weather Wing, 20 April 1961, and 1st Weather Wing 
Fact Sheet No. 1. 
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Among the facilities at Fuchu Air Station are: 
Airman's Open Mess, Banking Facility, Bowling Center, 
Chapel, Hobby Shop, Commissary, Exchange, Cafeteria, 
Gymnasium, Judo Hall, NCO Open Mess, Officers Open Mess, 
Service Club, Softball Field, two Swimming Pools, six 
Tennis Courts, Theatre, a nine.hole Pitch and Putt Golf 
Course, a Library and Education Center, a Family Service 
Center and a Youth Activities Center. 
There are several small Japanese towns surround-
ing Fuchu Air Station. For the most part the population 
is comprised of farmers and small store owners. Many 
of the younger people work at either military installa-
tions or in Tokyo. Many Americans live among these com-
munities. 
Washington Heights Housing Annex.--This is an 
off-base dependent housing facility of Fuchu Air Station. 
It houses dependents of U.S. military and civilian per-
sonnel. 
Washington Heights is located in the Shibuya 
Ward of Tokyo. It is 15 miles east of Fuchu. The fa-
cility covers approximately 228 acres. There are a total 
of 827 housing units. The majority of civilians (teachers, 
engineers, secretaries, etc.) are housed in the bachelor 
officers quarters. 
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In addition to facilities similar to those of 
Fuchu Air Station, Washington Heights houses a dependent 
elementary school, a kindergarten, four playgrounds and 
the University of Maryland Education Center. 
This Japanese community is compr~sed of the vari-
ous wards of Tokyo. Hence, the people are laborers, 
white collar workers, students, intellectuals, extreme 
right and left groups as well as conservatives. 
Grant Heights Housing Annex.--This is the largest 
of Fuchu's off-base dependent housing facilities. There 
are a total of 1,286 housing units. 
Grant Heights is located on the northwestern out-
skirts of Tokyo; it is two miles southwest of Camp Drake 
Army post and 13 miles northwest of Fuchu. The activ-
ities and facilities are similar to those at Fuchu. 
The Japanese communities are small towns and the 
people subsist mostly on farming and small shops. 
Green Park Housing Area.--This housing facility, 
33 acres in size, is located on the northwestern outskirts 
of Tokyo. Fuchu Air Station is approximately four and one-
half miles southwest of Green Park. 
There are 699 apartment units at Green Park. 
Twenty-six units are allocated to the Family Services 
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office for assignment as interim housing for families ar-
• riving concurrently with their sponsors. 
An elementary school and kindergarten are located 
here as well as the usual facilities such as found at 
Fuchu. 
The Japanese communities here are also mainly small 
towns and farms. 
Other Areas.--Momote Village borders on the south-
west side of Camp Drake and lies approximately one mile 
northwest of Grant Heights. It covers 142 acres and has a 
total of 168 housing units. South Camp Drake, located 
one mile east of Momote Village serves as a recreational 
facility for Security Forces Personnel, Its facilities 
include: an 18 hole Golf Course, and Bowling Alley, 
three Swimming Pools and a Fieldhouse. The Far East Net-
work, under operational control of Fifth Air Force, has 
headquarters and its Tokyo station is located here. 
Yamato Air Station serves as a back-up holding 
center for personnel arriving and departing the theater. 
It is located nine miles northwest of Fuchu and covers 
approximately 85 acres, There are no flying facilities 
and an air Force dependent high school is located here. 
Showa Air Station is utilized as a recreational 
and housing facility and is 10 miles northwest of Fuchu. 
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It covers an area of 143 acres with 22 housing units. 
The 18 hole Golf Course operates on a year-round basis. 
Organization 
Headquarters 1st Weather Wing includes approximately 
350 airmen, 95 officers and 1500 dependents of which 760 are 
children. 
In addition, three U.S. civilian secretaries and 
50 Japanese civilians work at the headquarters. 
The organization of the unit is as follows: 
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CHAPTER VI 
1st WEATHER WING INFORMATION PROGRAM 
Headquarters, 1st Weather Wing's Office of Informa-
tion is organized into three main divisions: Internal 
Information, Public Information and Community Relations. 
All of these divisions are interrelated; however, each 
one has specific objectives which it tries to achieve. In 
discussing each division and its various programs, one 
must constantly keep in mind that one officer is responsi-
ble for the smooth operation of the program. He has no 
airmen and only one part-time secretary. Therefore, h! 
must be a reservoir of specialized talent in communications, 
as well as a source of up-to-date information and back-
ground materials for the commander and his staff, since he 
has a position on the commander's personal staff. 
Internal Information 
This program has the basic purpose of keeping all 
personnel.well informed so that each will be a more ef-
fective and dedicated military man and citizen. 
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The responaibility for the program ia the com-
mandata aince hia leaderahip it primary in the effective-
ness of the unit'• carrying out ita mission. The program 
ia a tool of command. It provides a meana of establishing 
effective communication with the military and civilian 
personnel of the command. The information officer acts 
as the commander's advisor for the program; be super-
vises, organizes and operatet the internal information ac-
tivities. He also maintain• close coordination with other 
staff officers and commanders, and liaison with agencies 
associated with troop morale and welfare. 
The actual program can be better understood by 
breaking it down into objectives, aims, audience and the 
various programs used to reach the audience in support 
of the objectives. 
Oblectives 
The objectives of the internal information program 
have remained basically the same since World War II, and 
are intended to contribute to the effectiveness of the Air 
Force as an instrume~t of national policy: 
Instill in each Air Force member a sense of 
2ersonal dedication to country and duty necessary 
for him to be a determined member of the fighting 
force in wartime and efficient in his job at all 
times. 
Develop a devotion to career service in the 
Air Force. 
Provide each member with the background neces-
sary to make him an effective representative of 
the Air Force in the civilian community. 
Develop in each member an awareness of his 
responsibility as a representative of the United 
States in the foreign community when on overseas 
assignment.l 
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To achieve these objectives the 1st Weather Wing 
Internal Information Program endeavors to provide each 
member with the following: 
An awareness of his responsibilities and con-
tributions to the list Weather Wing mission; hence, 
to the Air Force and to the Nation. 
An appreciation of the value and dignity of the 
individual and the importance the 1st Weather Wing 
and the Air Force attach to individuals; and an 
appreciation of the importance of his tasks and of 
each member's contribution to the national defense, 
including the need for serving in Japan and main-
taining harmonious relations with the peoples of 
Japan. 
A more complete understanding of the facts and 
principles upon which is founded his adherence to 
the American form of government and to the precepts 
set forth in its Declaration of Independence, 
Constitution and laws. 
1Air Force Regulation 190-18, Air Force Internal 
Information Program, 8 Sept. 1961; AFR 190-lBA, 4 June 
1962. 
An understanding of international Communism, 
its meaning, aims, techni~ues, and basic con-
flict with the Free World s concept of the in-
herent worth of the human being. 
A thorough understanding of the roles and 
missions of the Air Force as evidenced by its 
various commands and of the official Air Force 
stand on key questions of doctrine and policy, 
together with an understanding of the missions 
of each of the sister services.Z 
The Internal Audience 
The audience to which the Wing endeavors to im-
part this understanding of facts and ideas is diverse. 
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The audience of first priority consists of approximately 
445 active duty military personnel. It is a well-educated 
and well-traveled audience. About sixty-five per cent of 
the officers are college graduates; and eighty-five per 
cent of the enlisted personnel are graduates of at least 
high school. Twenty per cent of the airmen have attended 
college and two per cent have at least one degree. 3 
Others in the internal audience are the three U.S. 
civilian secretaries, 1500 dependents, and even the fifty 
Japanese civilian employees must be considered. 
2Air Force Information Policy Letter, SAFOI, 
Number 102, March 1962, p. 17. 
3survey results obtained from base education sur-
vey of IWW personnel, 1 March 1960. 
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Various Programs 
The programs or activities used to reach the audi-
ence in support of the internal objectives can, for pur-
poses of description, be grouped into three areas in re-
gard to the individuals of the audience: (l) pre-arrival 
in Japan, (2) initial arrival, and (3) tour of duty period. 
Pre-Arrival Period 
As soon as the lst Weather Wing is notified of an 
\ 
airman's assignment to Japan, their sponsor program be-
comes operative. A form letter requesting appointment of 
a sponsor is sent from the information office to the of-
fice to which the airman will be assigned upon arrival. 
The letter gives the name, rank, family composition, re-
porting data (including flight number and departure date 
from the states), last duty station and leave address of 
the incoming airman4 for the sponsor's use. The office 
is given two days in which to name a sponsor who has been 
in the wing and area for at least six months, and who has 
a family composition similar to the assignee's. 5 
41st Weather Wing form letter, Appointment of a 
Sponsor, undated. 
51st Weather Wing Headquarter Office Instruction 
190-l, 21 March 1962. 
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When the sponsor is named, a brief letter of wel-
come which includes the sponsor's name is prepared. If 
the assignee is an officer the commander signs the letter 
and for enlisted personnel the information officer signs 
for the commander over his signature block. 
The sponsor is required by the HOI to write a 
personal letter to the assignee and his family within 
three weeks after his appointment. The sponsor's wife and 
family are also encouraged to write to the assignee's wife 
and family. The sponsor receives a sponsor folder from the 
information office. This folder has both a permanent and 
replaceable section. The permanent section contains 
sample letters (both for single or married personnel) 
which the sponsor may use. The only restrictions are that 
he must either write or type a copy of it as no form let-
ters are permitted. The replaceable section contains book-
lets, pamphlets and maps about the Wing, Fuchu Air Station 
and Japan which may be sent to the assignee. 
In addition to answering any letters of the assignee, 
the sponsor must according to the HOI have accomplished 
the following prior to his arrival: arranged for temporary 
quarters, arranged for the loan of dishes and utensils 
from the Family Services office, and arranged for trans-
portation from the port of debarkation to temporary 
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quarters for the assignee and his family. 
Initial Arrival 
When the assignee and his family arrive in Japan, 
the sponsor meets him at the port of debarkation and helps 
him settle temporarily. The sponsor's duties do not end 
here. He aids the assignee in obtaining housing, either 
government or private rental; assists the assignee in mov-
ing by obtaining transportation to choose furniture and 
have it delivered. He accompanies the assignee during 
pick up and registration of his privately-owned vehicle 
and accompanies him during his personnel processing into 
the Wing. He then arranges for the assignee to meet the 
commander. 
The military member is then given a briefing of 
the Wing's mission and the particular phase of the mission 
for which his section of assignment is responsible. Usu-
ally this briefing is given by the chief of the section. 
The assignee is subsequently taken on a tour of the Wing 
and introduced to the other personnel. 
Every newly-arrived military member and dependent 
is required by letter to attend two base orientations 
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within two weeks after their arriva1. 6 
The first--Orientation for Newly-Arrived Personnel 
--is important because in many cases this will be the only 
opportunity to reach the wives, particularly those of lower 
grade airmen. The base commander greats the new arrivals 
at the briefing and usually the commanders of tenant units 
are present. The orientation includes such topics as: 
Mission of the base, base facilities and activities, base 
policies, community activities, facilities and policies. 
For example, the town mayor usually greets newcomers, then 
the legal officer discusses Japanese law. For reenforce-
ment a movie depicting differences in driving is shown. 
The base information officer, who is conducting the course, 7 
then pursues a discussion on basic customs and traditions 
of Japan and illustrates by having a Japanese national 
8 give a demonstration of a condolence call. Then the 
people-to-people program is discussed with a few leading 
6Form letter issued by Headquarters 6100th Sup-
port Wing Information Office. 
7Air Force Regulation 190-18, Air Force Internal 
Information Program, 8 Sept. 1961; AF& 190-lSA, 4 June 
1962. 
8A condolence call is a personal call made to a 
Japanese home when any accident or incident results in a 
Japanese death. The person responsible, whether his fault 
or not, must make the call, present a gift of money and 
observe the customs. 
proponents giving personal accounts and advancing the 
unlimited opportunities of the programo 
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The second orientation requirement is the disaster 
control briefingo This is a structured briefing to in-
form both dependents and sponsors of the exact procedures 
to be followed should a disaster strike (war, typhoon, 
riot, etco 
Tour of Duty Period 
The previous two periods have served to illustrate 
that first impressions are often lasting ones and also 
that first impressions have the potential to reduce appre-
hension concerning a Japan assignment and influence atti-
tudes toward the situationo To continue to influence at-
titudes toward accepting the assignment as an opportunity 
by the military member and his family, programs of personal 
recognition were given emphasiso 
Personal Recognition Programs.--These programs in-
clude such activities as: Airman of the Month award, Nco9 
of the Quarter award, outstanding performance of duty or 
achievement in off-duty activitieso All of these programs 
9Non~commissioned officero 
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receive publicity which will be discussed under the public 
information program. However, a form of publicity which 
falls under the internal program is the commander's let-
ter to families. These letters not only are written for 
honors attained but also upon initial reporting for duty, 
promotions, hospitalizations, etc. A basic form letter is 
used, except in the case of hospitalization; however, 
each letter is individually typed and personally signed by 
the commander. 10 A mimeographed information fact sheet 
containing general information about the base and the 1st 
Weather Wing mission is used as an insert in the letter. 
Indoctrination of Wives.--The attitude of the wife 
toward life in the Air Force has a direct bearing on her 
husband's views and the understanding of the Air Force by 
her relatives, friends and neighbors. The information 
officer, therefore, works in close coordination with the 
various wives clubs' officers and the family services of-
ficer, since the most common channel of communication to 
wives other than their husbands, are the wives clubs and 
the family services program. 
Wing. 
10unwritten policy of Headquarters, 1st Weather 
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Other phases of the wives program include: 
(1) careful examination of complaints by wives concerning 
base activities that affect family life and base services 
that concern wives--the information officer is then in a 
position to recommend possible solutions to legitimate 
complaints to the commander; (2) the use of every oppor-
tunity to present the lst Weather Wing operational brief-
ing to wives groups to show how IWW participates in the 
Pacific Air Force mission; (3) open house for wives in-
cluding a tour of the IWW activities giving wives a chance 
to see their husbands at work. A question period is held 
by the commander and his staff to give wives an opportun-
ity to ask questions about activities and policies of the 
Wing as they affect the family. 
CommandersCall.--This is one of the most important 
mediums in reaching the military community. lst Weather 
Wing Commanders Call is conducted once a month and all 
military personnel (with the exception of one man from 
each office), both officers and airmen are required to 
attend. 11 Attendance of U.S. civilian personnel is en-
couraged by the commander. 
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The 1st Weather Wing Commanders Call is used as a 
leadership, management and communications medium for pro-
viding its personnel with information concerning the 
accomplishment of its missiono It is not used to meet 
training and educational requirementso 
The commander personally conducts the program while 
the information officer plans it, prepares and provides 
materials and introduces all guest speakerso 
Basic subject areas include: (1) those directly 
affecting the operation of the Wingo Work is interesting 
when there is an understanding of each job and the way it 
relates to the success of the Wing. This is what the com-
mander tries to doo When working conditions or policies 
cause discontent and elimination of them is impossible, 
then the commander explains to the personnel why the condi-
tions are necessaryo (2) The role of the Wing in meeting 
AWS and MATS objectives, and (3) effects of the Wing's 
operations in accomplishing the overall Air Force mission. 
Allied subjects include international affairs and events 
as they affect Air Force operationso In addition, matters 
directly affecting morale and esprit-de-corps such as pay, 
promotions, housing, individual and unit achievements, etc. 
are coveredo 
The information officer receives a great deal of 
guidance in planning this program. Special themes are 
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assigned on a quarterly basis, with one month of each 
quarter allocated to a Department of Defense (Armed Forces 
Information and Education) directed programs; one month 
for selected subjects; and one month for MATS and AWS ori-
ented programs. This pattern is repeated each quarter. 
Materials used to support the program consist of 
Armed Forces I & E and Air Force films supported by appro-
priate written material. A special 14 minute Air Force 
News Review film covering latest developments and activ-
ities Air Force-wide is used each month. 
Some of the Armed Forces I & E films used were: 
"An Anatomy of Aggression," a USIA film depicting Com-
munist aggression since World War II and u.s. action to 
counter it; "The Challenge of Ideas," an AFIE film show-
ing the conflict between communism and democracy; "A Study 
of the USSR," and AFIE film showing the industrial revolu-
tion that has led to the Soviet Union's climb as a mili-
tary power. 
Some Air Force films included: "Dyna-Soar program," 
the "Titan Missile System," "Air Force Defensive and Of-
fensive Alert Systems." Major command oriented films in-
cluded: "Tactical Air Forces World-Wide," "MATS Strategic 
Airlift Forces" and "Pacific Air Forces." 
The programs were not limited to the above and thus, 
they often served as a forum to help engender interest and 
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understanding about Japan, For example, during the treaty 
struggle speakers were procurred from: (l) the Japanese 
police who explained their peculiar position during the 
demonstrations; (2) Japanese industrialists who examined 
the role of industry and unions in Japan; (3) Japanese pro-
fessors who discussed Japanese education and problems left 
by occupation reforms; (4) small factory owners who dis-
cussed the Japanese system of hiring labor; (5) college 
students who discussed the lost feeling of Japan's youth. 
Each time there followed a question and answer period; how-
ever, the speaker also asked questions of many Americans. 
These programs were informative and enlightening. 
The Base Newspaper.--The 1st Weather Wing IO wrote 
stories and feature articles for the paper. It is men-
tioned here only because it reached 1st Weather Wing per-
sonnel. Besides providing a command tool and local news, 
the base newspaper featured many Japan-slanted stories, 
They are important because they played an important role in 
helping the American caught in the treaty struggle to under-
stand and to be better prepared to meet the action that 
followed, For example, a regular weekly feature that en-
hanced interest in things Japanese was "Enjoy Japan." 
Every week this article described some tourist spot, 
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special holiday, tradition or custom. 12 
Another weekly feature which generated interest 
in personal relations with Japanese was "Tomodachi."13 
This column reported the names and activities of person• 
nel engaged in the people-to-people program. 
Demonstration Information.--The internal program 
was also involved in informing personnel when and where 
treaty demonstrations were held. The information, admin· 
istrative services and provost marshal's office coordinated 
on how the problem was to be handled. It was decided that 
since all military personnel are required to read the daily 
bulletin, an attachment would be made to that medium of 
communication containing a map outline of the demonstration 
route and final site, Additionally, a recommendation to 
all personnel connected with the service to remain away 
from the depicted areas at the time of the demonstrations 
was made. 14 The guards at the gates of all military 
l2Kanto Plainsman, base publication, 6100th Sup-
port Wing. 
13romodachi is the Japanese word for friend. 
1~e Tokyo Metropolitan Police provided the 
information since all planned demonstrations, locations 
and approximate numbers expected had to be reported to 
avoid police interference. 
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installations stopped each car entering and leaving and 
gave them a copy of the attachment. It was also posted in 
all barracks, clubs and recreational areas. 
Other Internal Information Activities.--An informa-
tion bulletin board located directly outside the entrance 
to the mail room was maintained. This was considered as an 
excellent means to communicate information. There were 
several Wing information programs conveyed in this way. 
Among them were: (1) Japanese language program. The 
information officer posted one Japanese phrase on the bul-
letin board each day. Personnel were required by super-
visors to learn a phrase a day. However, there was no test-
ing device, so that usually only the interested or curious 
benefited. Also all Japanese language classes offered by 
the base education office were posted. (2) Library co-
operation. The information officer coordinated with the 
base librarian and worked out a program. The librarian com-
piled a list of all available books dealing with military 
affairs and aerospace. Also a list of books about Japan 
was compiled; this list was further divided subjectively: 
culture, history, government, customs, traditions, flower 
arranging, sports, cooking, etc. The lists were posted on 
the information bulletin board and as new books were re-
ceived by the library, they were added to the list. The 
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interest in the library by the information officer often 
led to extremely good cooperation between the library and 
IWW personnel. 
Information Library 
A list of pamphlets, booklets, etc. on communism, 
newly emerging countries, U.S. foreign policy and other 
materials received from Armed Force Information and Educa-
tion were posted as available in the Information office. 
Evaluation of the Internal 
Information Program 
A program can only be considered effective when 
it is meeting its stated objectives. Therefore, this evalu-
ation will attempt to determine the effectiveness of the IWW 
internal information program by correlating each objective 
and the activities utilized to meet i·t: 
1. Instill in each Air Force member a sense of personal 
dedication to country and duty necessary for him to 
be a determined member of the fighting force in war-
time and efficient in his job at all times. 
The three programs used to realize this objective 
were: commanders call, base newspaper and information 
bulletin board. In commanders call the informational 
technique of presenting facts in the form of talks, movies, 
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discussion~ etc. was utilized, in order to alter attitudes 
or to reenforce them. For example, to develop or re-
enforce healthy attitudes toward our form of government it 
was deemed wiser to present movies which analyzed the 
causes of communism rather than spending time developing 
arguments against communism. A single situation such as 
a movie can sometimes alter attitudes on radical, social 
and economic questions. 15 Thus, movies analyzing communism 
altered the radical approach to reenforce a sense of per-
sonal dedication to country. 
Other movies tended to determine the understanding 
of the role and mission of the Air Force by depicting all 
phases of Air Force activity. Work is interesting and 
motivation high wnen a person sees his duties as important. 
Motivation to do a good job declines when a person does 
not understand the why of what he is doing or feels he makes 
no contribution to the total effort. 16 Thus, the personal 
talks by the commander who by his position offers credibil-
ity and expertise, were used to show the various offices 
how its activities related to the successful operation of 
the Wing. These face-to-face contacts with the men did 
15s.P. Rosentha~"Changes in Socio-Economic 
Attitudes," Arch. PsychologY, 1948, 25, No. 166, p. 46. 
16c.R. Wickert, "Employees Feelings of Ego-
Involvement in the Day to Day Operation of a Company," 
Person. Psychol., 1951, u, pp. 1-14. 
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much to raise the importance of each job. As Wilke proved 
in his experiments a speach given in person is more ef-
fective in influencing attitudes than the same speech 
given by radio or the printed page. 17 
Therefore, one sees the program is adequately sup-
porting the first objective. 
2. Develop a devotion to career service in the Air Force. 
The activities concerned with attaining this ob-
jective were: Commanders Call, sponsor program, personal 
recognition programs, indoctrination of wives and letters 
to families. 
Commanders call as already has been show, empha-
sized the value and dignity of the individual and the im-
portance the Air Force and, in particular, IWW attaches 
to individuals. 
Personal recognition programs recognize that praise 
is a form of ego satisfaction and adults can readily be 
motivated with it. Especially is this true when the com-
mander personally congratulates the person receiving the 
recognition. The personal recognition program serves as 
an incentive for career service. The enthusiasm of the 
person receiving recognition influences the personnel in 
17 W.H. Wilke, "An Experimental Comparison of the 
Speed\ Radio, and the Printed Page," Arch. Psychol., 1934, 
No. 16 9 , p • 32 • 
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his section and their spirit in turn inspires the person. 
The enthusiasm or pride of the section spreads to other 
sections. Group membership therefore becomes a source of 
motivation and may operate to increase the group's in-
centive toward career service. 
Letters to families offer the commander his one 
opportunity to exert a direct influence of the attitudes 
that relatives and friends of twW members have toward the 
Air Force. In turn, favorable attitudes toward the 
service and IWW assignment will cause an expression of a 
series of favorable opinions which when fed back to the 
IWW member will aid in strengthening or developing his 
devotion to career service. 
The sponsor program and orientation programs serve 
a basic need of individuals--the need to be wanted and 
belong. Good adjustment depends on having that need 
satisfied. Newly transferred personnel leave a situation 
in which they have a known position and status and enter 
one in which they alone are strangers. Often this feeling 
is exaggerated in their minds because of their known or 
imagined dissimilarity in social experiences with the 
Japanese. The above programs help to bridge this gap, 
thus reducing apprehension and influencing attitudes to-
ward the assignment and the Air Force as a career. 
Indoctrination programs for wives is primary 
because the attitude of the wife is an important factor 
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in the attitude of the husband toward IWW and the Air Force. 
Many trained men have been lost solely because their wives 
did not like service life. Many others give less than 
their best to their jobs because of domestic discord 
arising from the wife's dislike for the service. Also, 
the attitude of service wives exerts a direct influence 
on the opinion of the Air Force held by her family and 
friends. Thus the service member indirectly is again in-
fluenced. Programs for the wife can often ferret out 
conditions that create discontent or irritation for her. 
While it is not always possible to eliminate these condi-
tions, an explanation of why they are necessary helps her 
to understand them. This is a step toward acceptance. 
Also having the wife see her husband on the job 
with an explanation of what he does and how it fits into 
the big picture is an effective method of developing a 
favorable attitude toward career service on the part of 
wives. 18 
18Air Force Information Services Letter, Supple-
ment No. 71, August 1956. 
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The next two objectives will be considered to-
gether since both relate to IWW personnel as representa-
tives in the community and country. 
3. 
4. 
Provide each member with the background necessary to 
make him an effective representative of the Air Force 
in the civilian community. 
Develop in each member an awareness of his responsi-
bility as a representative of the United States in 
the foreign community when on overseas assignment. 
All of the activities previously discussed aided 
in achieving these objectives. The face-to-face contact 
of military members and Japanese at commanders call pro-
vided basic comprehensive information on customs, manners, 
history and related data of both Japan and the local com-
munity. The sponsor program provided the impetus for the 
newly-arrived family to develop an awareness of the 
responsibilities and opportunities of their assignment in 
Japan. The orientation course and indoctrination of 
wives conveyed some new information but it also re-
enforced informaation given through the sponsor program, 
orientation program and first hand knowledge gained from 
the sponsor in face-to-face contact. 
The use of the information bulletin board to 
provide a Japanese phrase a day, lists of available books 
on both aerospace and Japan, lists of available material 
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on United St~tes government and policy and pertinent in-
formation concerning the responsibility of military per-
sonnel as United States citizens in a foreign country also 
helped to achieve these objectives. 
Public Information Program 
In a public information program the first step is 
to clearly define your objectives, determine your pub-
lics and then initiate programs to reach the publics and 
achieve the objectives. The public information program 
of the IWW is not so encompassing as a base program would 
be. 
Objectives 
Assure a thorough understanding of the IWW by the 
public. 
Releasing news on the achievements of IWW and its 
personnel. 
Keeping good relations with the public and civilian 
counterparts. 
Active participation in the home-town release 
program. 19 
19 Op. cit., AFM 190-4. 
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Publics 
The program is concerned with four publics in 
Japan: The American people, Americans in Japan, the 
Japanese people and the people in the rest of the world. 
Various Programs 
To reach the American people the main program 
used by the information officer is the hometown release 
program and the American press in Japan. 
Hometown Release Program 
A biographical sketch for each individual assigned 
to 1st Weather Wing is maintained by the I.O. When a 
person transfers, the biography is destroyed. The bi-
ography contains pertinent data on the individual; for 
example, name, address, hometown, awards, decorations, job, 
service record, family, etc. When the individual receives 
personal recognition for duty performance or off-duty 
activities, a release is prepared on a Home Town News 
Release form20 giving all data contained on the biograph-
ical sketch. The release is then sent to the Hometown 
20Home Town News Release Form, AF Form 123A, 
20 Jan. 1962. 
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News Center at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. The Cen-
ter releases the story to the local newspaper of the 
individual. This is one of the primary sources for news 
dissemination. 
American Press in Japan 
The American people are informed by the American 
press in Japan. There are American correspondents in 
Japan representing the wire services, daily papers, radio 
and television stations and magazines. 
Fifth Air Force Headquarters furnishes a list of 
accredited correspondents to the IWW information office. 
Thus, when one calls who is not on the list, he is re-
ferred to the Fifth Air Force Information Office at Fuchu 
Air Station. Often these reporters wish a feature story 
or still or motion pictures depicting weather activities 
that are of interest to the general public. 21 
To inform Americans in Japan, including non-
military people, reliance is on two major media: 
21A film was made depicting the reconnaissance 
activities of locating a typhoon, subsequent warnings, 
etc. This was incorporated into a film entitled, "Hurri-
cane Hunters," which was releaaed for public showing by 
the Air Force. 
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Stars and Stripes 
This is an Armed Forces newspaper which features 
news from the United States, news about Japan and base and 
unit news. The IWW receives photo-feature articles peri-
odically, especially during the typhoon seasom; people-to-
people coverage and coverage of unit and individual 
achievements. The feature articles are usually written 
by an S & S reporter with the full cooperation and co-
ordination of the IWW information officer. 
Far East Network 
The Far East Network station in Japan carries three 
fifteen minute weather broadcasts daily. 22 A sound sta-
tion is set up at Headquarters Fifth Air Force and 1st 
Weather Wing personnel (from the weather central) broad-
case each program live. The name of the organization and 
the officer making the broadcast are identified in the 
broadcast. 
The Japan~se people are the next public and de-
pend primarily on the Japanese media although surveys 
220ne is given at seven A.M., one at 12 noon and 
one at six P.M. 
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indicated the Japanese people listened to the Far East 
Network for news and music, which they used primarily as 
a tool for learning English. Emphasis is placed on ob-
taining coverage of IWW stories in the Japanese papers. 
There was no indication during the treaty struggle of a 
cutback in releases printed, although most IWW releases 
the the Japanese press deal with community relations or 
people-to-people activities. 
The fourth public, international, seldom concerns 
the IWW with the exception of factual typhoon news. 
Evaluation of Public Information Program 
All of the objectives of this prosram are re-
lated to assuring an understanding of the IWW by its 
various publics. These objectives are all achieved by 
releasing news on the operations and achievements of the 
IWW and its personnel. 
That IWW releases continued to be published in 
the Japanese papers during the treaty struggle is an ex-
ample of the excellent cooperation and coordination be-
tween the Information officer and his Japanese counter-
parts. It illustrates that good personal relations is 
an important phase of a preventive public relations 
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program. For if the information officer had not kept 
his finger on the pulse of day-to-day events, maintained 
good personal relations and kept the commander advised, 
releases may have purposely been misinterpreted in the 
press and created poor public relations resulting in the 
necessity for a remedial program. Instead, alertness, 
objective evaluations and advice from Japanese reporter 
friends, resulted in the expert handling of public im-
pressions of IWW personnel through the various communica-
tions media which help shape public opinion. 
Perhaps the good reputation of the IO with the 
Japanese reporters was because he specialized in getting 
his information to the public for a motive and both he 
and his Japanese friends realized this. The personal 
contacts can do what nothing else can do and once you 
build them, they can be used time after time. 
Community Relations Program 
At no time in the history of our country has it 
been so important for us to create good will with for-
eigp countries and demonstrate the desireability of 
democracy to the rest of the world. This is the basic 
premise of the IWW community relations program. The spe-
cific objectives are: 
Objectives: 
To recognize the interrelationships of respon-
sibility between the IWW and the communities lo-
cated near Fuchu Air Station. 
To establish and maintain as complete a state 
of mutual acceptance, respect, cooperation and 
appreciation as is possible between the IWW and 
the communities affected by its operation. 
Ensure that IWW personnel are aware of their 
role as spokesmen for the United States.23 
Various Programs 
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The programs as discussed in this section will 
be a representative number of projects carried on in the 
interest of promoting better understanding and coopera-
tion between the IWW and its host publics. 
Coordination and Liaison Activities with 
Foreign Meterological Agencies 
The Greater Tokyo Branch of the American Meteoro-
logical Society, with membership comprised of USAF, U.S. 
civilian and Japanese meteorologists is an active force 
in promoting an exchange of professional knowledge and 
enhances cultural relationships between the USAF in the 
23Air Force Regulation 190-20, Community Rela-
tions Program, 8 May 1957. 
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Far East and Japan. The AMS meets once a month. The 
president is usually the IWW commander and the vice presi-
dent a Japanese member of the AMS. 
The IWW sponsored a U.S.-Asian Military Weather 
Symposium at John Hay AFB, Philippines in 1960 and 1961. 
Representatives of the military weather service of the 
U.S., Great Britain, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thai-
land, Nationalist China and Cambodia and their national 
civil counterparts were represented. Also representatives 
of the civilian weather services of Australia, Hong Kong, 
The Malay Federation and the Ryukyu Islands. The prime 
objective of the symposiums was the development of an 
approved military assistance program for weather. 
A close working relationship was established be-
tween the staff officers of IWW and the Japanese Meterolog-
ical Agency (JMA). Generally, this involved various con-
tracts, coordination of circuits and schedules, and loans 
and/or exchanges of meterological data and publications 
with JMA. The information officer, IWW arranges visits 
of JMA personnel to the IWW Weather Central and Field 
Maintenance Shop. 
Japanese meteorologists were assisted by the IWW 
information office in the preparation of English trans-
lations of papers for presentation at the International 
Numerical Weather Prediction Symposium conducted in 
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Tokyo, 7-11 November 1960o 
The IWW assisted the JMA in the formulation of 
plans for construction and operation of their weather 
controlo The information office, IWW conducted tours 
through the IWW weather central for interested JMA per-
sonnelo 
Support of Base and/or Command Programs 
Base open-house activities in Japan in connection 
with Armed Forces Day and other United States and local 
national holidays are supported. This is generally in the 
form of displays and demonstrations; for example, setting 
up and demonstrating a mobile weather station or a mock 
typhoon machineo IWW personnel were furnished to carry 
out the demonstrations and answer questionso 
IWW gave full support to the Oiso Beachhead project 
by providing 70 members to participateo This is an annual 
UoSo Forces Japan Children's Party and is jointly spon-
sored by USFJ and the owner-operator of the seaside re-
sort, the Seibu Railway Companyo Each military family 
group or single military sponsor is paired off with orphan 
children from several local orphanages in a "family-for-
the day" arrangemento The Americans provide food and en-
tertainment for their temporary wards. 
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Miscellaneous activities in this area included 
support to the Japanese Community Chest Campaign, Far 
East Benevolent Association-Tokyo, and Flood Relief Drive 
in Tokyo. 
Storm Reconnaisance 
These weather units are widely recognized for their 
humanitarian efforts in providing valuable data on loca-
tions of devastating storms. These flights and their 
data have received widespread publicity throughout Japan 
since storms are frequent and devastating in this area 
and the local populace are acutely storm conscious. That 
the Japanese are appreciative of these efforts was ef-
fectively demonstrated whe~ a plane on a weather mission 
crashed near the small village of Ishikawa in northern 
Japan, killing all eleven crew members. 
As a tribute to the sacrifice of this crew and in 
recognition of the valuable storm data previously provided, 
the Ishikawa city officials dedicated a large marble 
shrine to the memory of the weathermen who had lost their 
lives in the crash. Later, Ishikawa city officials of the 
memorial committee, the chief of the city's General Af-
fairs Bureau and other townsmen were guests of the weather 
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unit and the commander of the base. They were given a 
tour of the base and were honored guests at a dinner at 
the Officer's Club, 
Humanitarian Services 
The IWW has an adopted orphanage, the Shiratari 
Orphanage. They have donated nearly $1,000 to date for 
its operation as well as procuring a stove and refriger-
ator for it. Men, under the direction of the non-
commisioned officers advisory council24 helped repair and 
rennovate the building. The orphanage is composed of 135 
orphans ranging from three years to fifteen years, An-
other section houses a home for fifty-three aged men and 
women. 
The IWW holds an annual Christmas Party for both 
sections. The wives of IWW personnel donate cookies, 
fruit and candy and other donated funds provide for milk. 
Clothes are also donated at this time, The IWW commander, 
executive officer and personnel chosen by the NCO Advisory 
Council attend the party. The orphans sing several 
24A council organized to keep the IWW commander 
and information officer advised on,problems of personnel 
morale and welfare. 
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Christmas hymns and the party begins. It is always well 
publicized since two Japanese reporter friends of the 
information office receive an invitation to the party 
from the director of the orphanage. 
Another humanitarian act involved a weather plane 
on a regular weather mission. While enroute, it was 
diverted to investigate a suspected tropical storm area. 
Through radio contact, it learned that an automobile ac-
cident had occurred on Kwajalein Island of the Marshal 
Islands and that the victim was badly injured and needed 
hospital care. Upon learning this, the aircraft commander 
diverted further in order to pick up the critically in-
jured man and take him to Guam. The aircraft transported 
Clerm Laprezes, a Marshallese, to Guam in six hours, fly-
ing at an altitude of 1,000 feet; even at this low level, 
it was necessary to pressurize to 500 feet due to his 
multiple skull fractures. 
The Japanese press carried the story and the 
Information office received a letter of deep appreciation 
from the man's parents. 
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Support of Wives Clubs Programs 
The best example of this type support by the IWW 
was the preview of American home life program in 1960. 
More than 125 Japanese students--all high school exchange 
students due to begin classes at various locations through-
out the U.S. in the fall of 1960--were treated to an 
afternoon filled with pointers on American custom and 
tradition. 
In August, through the cooperation of the Far 
East Women's Club, the Japanese teenagers received a 
first hand preview of American home life when they visited 
several homes of military families in the Washington 
Heights housing area, six of whom were IWW personnel. 
The students, 63 boys and 62 girls, had been 
selected by the Japanese Ministry of Education to partici-
pate in the High School Student Exchange program and were 
to study for one year in the U.S. The American Field 
Service, sponsor of the exchange program, is an independ-
ent organization operating out of New York City and exists 
solely on contributions. 
In the u.s. the students were to live in American 
homes and attend American high school classes, many 
graduating before their return home, Subsistence cost 
was to be born by the host families and the communities 
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in which they live. 
People-to-People Program 
To help foster individual activities by IWW per-
sonnel, a people-to-people orientation was conducted 
monthly and all personnel who had arrived subsequent to 
the previous orientation were requested to attend. The 
orientation was brief and usually followed one of the re-
quired orientations, so that the personnel would not have 
to come out twice. The briefing was a little more mean-
ingful to them since the IWW information officer pre-
sented it. The talk was to help ensure that the IWW per-
sonnel were aware of their role and responsibilities as 
spokesmen for the United States. The talk presented in 
1960 was as follows: 
We are spokesmen for the United States. 
That's a plain statement of fact. And whether 
we fanci ourselves in the role or not, our coun-
try wil be judged by the impressions we make. 
This take in all of us--single, married, husband, 
wife or child. 
Any way we look at it representing our coun-
try in Japan is a pretty big assignment. Some-
times we will have good answers to questions 
Japaneae aak ua. Often we will not. Few of ua 
are so well informed that we have a ready answer 
to every question. 
However, being a spokesman for the United 
States .ian' t altogether a matter of what we say 
and how thoughtfully we say it. Some of us may 
not say fifty words about American life and 
foreign policy. Yet we still represent America 
for better or worse by the way we conduct our-
selves. 
One thing about good manners: they're 
international. And they're a pretty good pass-
port. 
Friendliness, politeness and a willingness 
to get along are coins any Japanese will accept. 
Spending these coins freely will do more than 
money to win you--and the United States--the 
understanding and goodwill of the Japanese. 
Every country has its customs and traditions. 
Good manners require that we familiarize our-
selves with those of Japan and that we respect 
them. 
Remember many Japanese who don't speak 
English understand it. Any remarks made in pub-
lic are usually understood. So--;.watch the wise-
cracks. 
Remember one other thing. It's never easy 
to adjust to a new way of life and different 
culture. It will be harder for some of you than 
others. 
Once the novelty of your situation wears off, 
it's quite possible you will feel emotionally let 
down and insecure. You may even find yourself 
leaning heavily on fellow Americans, glorifying 
everything American and blaming everything that 
goes wrong on Japan and the Japanese. This 
unpleasant reaction is sometimes called "culture 
shock." I went through it, too, as I imagine 
most people do. 
But, by knowing in advance what the experi-
ence is like you can guard against it or over-
come it quickly once you begin to understand the 
environment. As soon as you start to mix with 
the poeple and share their activities, you will 
find a whole new world open up for you. 
I could tell you loads of experiences I've 
had with the people-to-people program; instead, 
I have three people I'd like you to hear (of-
ficers wife -- NCO -- airman and his wife and 
a bachelor airman-- 3 minutes each). 
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When the speakers were finished, the information 
officer had a table set up at the exit. Pamphlets on the 
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people-to-people program, Americans Abroad and Fact 
Sheets prepared by the information office on materials 
available from both that office and the base library were 
available. 25 
Individual Activities 
Throughout Japan there is a widespread and in-
tense interest in the mastery of English grammar and con-
versation of the part of the populace, notably among the 
high school and college students. 1st Weather Wing person-
nel made it a practice (especially during the treaty 
struggle) to invite local nationals into their homes pri-
marily for this purpose. Many individuals conducted both 
formal and informal English conversation classes, all 
without remuneration. Some noteworthy examples of this 
type activity follow: 
1. A 1st Lt. conducted a weekly English grammar 
and conversation class for seven Japanese employees of the 
1st Weather Wing. She also prepared tapes weekly for six 
high schools, using their texts. The tapes were used to 
learn pronunciation and enunciation. Also the Lt. con-
ducted a weekly discussion period with twenty college 
25speech was prepared from information contained 
in pamphlets on the people-to-people program, Americans 
abroad, and culture shock. Speech was taken from author's 
personal files. 
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students at Chofu City Hall, a small town near Tokyo. 
The discussions usually centered on history, government, 
custom and tradition and international events. 
2. A Major assisted a college graduate in attain· 
ing a mastery of the English language that aided him in 
obtaining a Fulbright scholarship and an assistantship in 
Chemistry at the University of Ohio for one year. 
3. An Airman First Class aided nine Japanese 
from various walks of life in conversational English. 
4. Three dependents appeared on local Japanese 
television programs of English language study. 
5. A M/Sgt. and hia wife were volunteer teachers 
of English at a Tokyo high school. 
6. Japanese young people visited a Chief Warrant 
Officer and his wife three night per week for English 
conversation and cultural exchange. The wife served as a 
judge at an English speech contest held by the English 
Literature Club of Maiji University, Tokyo. 
7. A let Lt. and hia wife sponsored the Seijo• 
American English Club, comprised of twenty students of 
Seijo University, Tokyo, 
first all English school 
The atudents published the 
paper,the Seijoites. The club 
established an exchange prosram with other colleges. 
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Other individual-type activities entered into by 
IWW personnel include the following: 
1. A staff sergeant assisted a Tokyo minister 
(Japanese) in conducting religious services for Japanese 
civil prisoners. 
2. A Lt. Col. worked with a local Japanese Boy 
Scout troop, arranging and conducting joint camporees and 
other programs with the base Scout troops. 
3. A 1st Lt. sponsored the Japanese Zeta Chapter 
of the international cultural sorority, Beta Sigma Phi, 
which has its headquarters in the United States. Japanese 
Zeta is the pioneer for the sorority in Japan, as it is 
the first all-Japanese chapter to be founded in Japan, 
Some activities of this group included: 
a. Translation of selected English books 
into Japanese. 
b. Operation Sight--A special project where 
money is earned through fund drives (bazaars, dances, etc.) 
and donated to the Holy Light Society to build one of 
Japan's first homes for the blind. This work has received 
the support of Princess Chichibu, sister-in-law of 
Emperor Hirohito of Japan. The princess praised the ef-
forts of the Japan Zeta group and expressed the need for 
such organizations to help the women of Japan to better 
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understand women the world over. 26 
Evaluation of Community Relations Program 
The activities engaged in by 1st Weather Wing per-
sonnel as outlined in this section, have effectively con-
tributed to the overall USAF Community Relations Program. 
The numerous friendly personal contacts, the voluntary 
efforts of weather personnel and their dependents to as-
sist the less fortunate of the local populaces, financi-
ally and otherwise; the work of individuals and groups 
with those seeking mastery of English conversation; and 
all other selfless activities in behalf of the Japanese 
have done much to create goodwill and dispel many miscon-
ceptions and misunderstandings concerning Americans. 
These activities have also helped IWW personnel under-
stand the Japanese a little better (especially during 
the treaty struggle period) and in so doing have fostered 
improved relations between the twW personnel and nearby 
Japanese communities. Thus, the objectives of the program 
are being accomplished. 
26Examp1es were taken from 1st Weather Wing Com-
munity Relations file, Information Office, Headquarters 
1st Weather Wing, Fuchu A.S., Japan. 
CHAPTER VII 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OVERSEAS 
INFORMATION OFFICER 
If one is to effectively represent the United 
States Air Force as an information officer overseas, there 
are several basic areas other than communications tech-
niques with which he should be familiar: 
1. Know the Air Force, This seems almost in-
nane; however, many officers cannot answer in easily under-
stood language questions about the Air Force mission, 
organization, capabilities, personnel and equipment, etc, 
2. Know your organization. This is a primary 
responsibility to your commander. An excellent way to be-
come familiar with your organization and its relation to 
the command mission and other base units is to utilize the 
past historical reports. Often these histories trace 
your organization through many changes, emphasizing prob-
lem areas and achievements. You are the eyes and ears 
of your commander and must always be prepared to explain. 
3. Be available 24 hours a day. There is no 
substitute for availability and no better way to create 
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good will. 
4. Don't become a mimeograph machine. There 
are too many handouts. Do not release trivial, insignifi-
cant material. You cannot measure your success by column 
inches published. These are false standards, What is 
said, the manner in which it is said and the public's 
confidence in its reliability are more important than 
mere measurement of column inches. 
5. You must merit the commander's full support 
since you are a member of his staff. If it is necessary 
to "sell" yourself and abilities to the commander, do it. 
Do not sit back and wait for the overture. Only with di-
rect contact and suppor.t of the commander can you carry 
out an effective program. 
6. You must, as a member of the staff, counsel 
and advise the commander and other staff members. To 
advise anyone effectively you will need a broad knowl-
edge as described in one and two above, as well as in-
formation concerning the local Japanese public, their 
organizations, activities, history, tradition and customs. 
Therefore, I propose, that any information officer going 
overseas must read, at a minimum, basic material on the 
social, cultural, economic and political aspects of the 
country. I believe he should also be sent to some school 
for a six weeks' intensified language course. He also 
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should have attended, at a minimum, the Air Force Short 
Course for Information Officers. In this way the officer 
would be in a position to run an effective program, keep 
the commander informed, serve as a counselor and act for 
the commander within the limits he prescribes. 
7. You are the commander's representative, not 
the commander, Do not sign instructions ordering airmen 
and higher ranking officers than yourself to attend 
briefings, commanders calls and orientations. Prepare 
such documents, but have the commander, deputy or execu-
tive officer sign them. 
Future Research Opportunities 
The USAF has experienced many overseas situations 
such as the incident described in this study. Each one 
has seen the utilization of known public relations tech-
niques and the introduction of new ones; some achieving 
great success--some detrimental to the program. 
A valuable research project would be the compila-
tion and analyzation of the various public relations and 
communications methods and, techniques tried and tested 
in information programs and related staff operations 
during critical periods. Such a composite might lead 
us to a more effective program of preventive and 
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affirmative public relations and mitigate the conflicts 
requiring emphasis of a remedial nature. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
American-Japanese relations today illustrate the 
capacity of two peoples emerging from very different cul-
tural backgrounds to communicate with each other in an 
increasingly effective manner. 
As has been noted previously trade and other eco-
nomic ties between our two societies are of basic signifi-
cance. In addition, a growing network of cultural com-
munications has been built. The United States and the 
Japanese have more to say to each other at present in 
such diverse fields as art and architecture, science and 
the social sciences than would have been dreamed possible 
at the end of World War II. In part this is a discovery 
of appealing facets of our different cultures, coupled 
with a willingness to accept change. In part, it is the 
natural result of the increasing similarity of two 
peoples both of whom seem dedicated to modernity. We 
should not underestimate the importance, real and poten-
tial, of this new trend. In the United States there has 
been an almost total disappearance of anti-Japanese senti-
ment, and enthusiasm for Japanese art, architecture, 
architecture, handicrafts and precision instruments. 
Japan has probably never made a deeper cultural impact 
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at any time than she is making today on the United States. 
In turn, we have affected almost every aspect of Japan-
ese life in the last ten years--food, clothing, amuse-
ments, music, ideas and even language. 
Yet in analyzing the complete security--treaty 
struggle, we find the American-Japanese alliance is still 
too heavily dependent upon support from limited segments 
of Japanese society: conservative party leaders, the 
business community and a portion of the bureaucracy. We 
need a policy of diplomacy in depth. We need to open 
channels of contact with the political opposition as well 
as the government in power, to labor and the intellectuals 
as well as to the business world. This is one of our 
lessons derived from the treaty struggle. 
It is also important that the image of the United 
States be recast in a more accurate light: we should be 
seen as a dynamic, revolutionary society in which the com-
mon man has risen higher in a generation than in any 
other society, and where culture has been brought to the 
masses in unprecedented degree. It is time to make 
known our symphonies, art galleries, our writers, creative 
social science and public relations programs as well as 
our bombs. 
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Because we have not pursued a dynamic policy of 
diplomacy in depth, nor paid adequate attention to the 
American image in the past, we have not taken full ad-
vantage of all the potentialities in American-Japanese 
relations. Indeed, anti-Americanism has grown in some 
Japanese circles, especially among intellectuals and 
labor union groups. There is some indication that a num-
ber of Japanese left-wing intellectuals are now seeking a 
substitute for Marxism or at least some modification of 
it to fit Japan. 1 This trend can be greatly abetted by 
an intelligent, broadly-guaged American policy aimed at 
an appeal to all elements in Japanese society. 
It must be emphasized that there is very little 
personal anti-Americanism in Japan. Even among those 
groups who object to American policy, the doors to com-
munication are open. This was evidenced by the military 
community relations and people-to-people programs during 
the most intense period of the treaty struggle. Students 
would demonstrate and riot by day, but appear in American 
homes at night for their English lessons. Professors and 
~is impression was gained during various dis-
cussions with Japanese from all walks of life during my 
two years and eight months in Japan. 
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teachers would incite students to demonstrate against 
President Eisenhower's trip yet still participate in edu-
cational discussions with American teachers; college stu-
dents appeared for classes conducted by Americans (with-
out pay) concerning the processes of democracy, 
Previously, reasons were given why neutralism is 
popular in Japan and why it will continue to have appeal, 
However, it is probable the Japan-American alliance will 
remain intact, Indications are strong that the conserva-
tives will stay in power for a considerable period, They 
will continue to support the alliance with insistence 
upon greater partnership and our recognition of certain 
Japanese "special circumstances" and "special interests,"2 
We are anxious for Japan to assume a more active role in 
the world, finding the raison d'etre in services to the 
Afro-Asian world of both an economic and political nature. 
The real conclusion of the analysis of the treaty 
struggle and all of its aspects is that the American-
Japanese alliance must find its real significance in 
economic, political, and cultural interaction rather than 
in military power. This need makes military power no 
2rtalics mine. 
valuable to our two countries and to the general cause 
of world peace and progress. 
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